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Abstract This paper intends to shed light on the contentious theme of the reception
of legal transplantation in the host environment, by examining the 2014 legislative
reform of legal capital in China, which at least on paper imitates the enabling
settings of US Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA). The paper
looks at the interconnections between national-specific contextual elements, the
resultant complexities, and the spillover effects of transplanted configurations in the
unique Chinese socio-cultural setting, implicating the discrepancy between the ‘law
in practice’ and the borrowed words ‘on the books’, and suggesting the importance
of gaining a holistic understanding of ‘law’ involving the legal traditions in both the
donor country and the recipient nation.
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1 Introduction
‘East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’.1 The
insurmountable divide between the East and the West described by Kipling over
a century ago has, at least in form, been mitigated in the contemporary practice of
law and development in China.2 Future legal scholars, looking back at the
development of Chinese company law legislation from 1978 to the new millennium,
will note that the law has been positively open to foreign influences to a degree
unimaginable in previous times, particularly ‘common practices in advanced market
economies in the West’, and legislative changes concerning legal capital are no
exception.3 While a formal and obligatory ex ante legal capital framework was
initially expounded in China’s 1993 Company Law regime, light-years away from
the enabling company law regime prevalent in advanced market-based economies,
subsequent reforms in 2005 seemed to be increasingly moving in this direction. In
particular, in the latest 2014 reform the Chinese seemed ready for a bigger dose of
market liberalism, taking on the essence of the so-called Washington Consensus4:
the abolition of regulations that impede the entry of new firms or restrict
competition. Over three days leading up to 1 January 2014 an approved revision to
the 2005 Company Law, albeit brief, unveiled a significant reform to China’s
market entry system. Departing from its conventional civil law preference for ex
ante legal capital rules, ten company law provisions, all relating to the raising of
capital, were either amended or abolished, including the removal of minimum
capital thresholds, the simplification of capital contribution requirements, and the
abolition of independent evaluation of capital injections.5
Echoing the powerful rhetoric of aligning Chinese corporate law more closely
with that of other developed economies, much scholarly ink has been spilled in
China commending this legislative change as the ‘legal cornerstone underpinning
China’s future economic development’6 and advocating its effectiveness in
1 Rudyard Kipling, ‘The Ballad of East and West’, The Pioneer, 2 December 1889, quoted in Winefield
(1987), p 1.
2 The poem as a whole emphasized commonality and equal respect for cultures of the East and the West,
rather than highlighting their differences. Carrington (1955), p 136.
3 Qiu (2006).
4 ‘[…] The term “Washington Consensus” […] has come to refer to development strategies focusing
around privatization, liberalization, and macro-stability; a set of policies predicted upon a strong faith
[…] in unfettered markets and aimed and reducing, or even minimizing the role of government.’ J.E.
Stiglitz, ‘The Post Washington Consensus Consensus’, The Initiative for Policy Dialogue 1, http://
policydialogue.org/files/events/Stiglitz_Post_Washington_Consensus_Paper.pdf.
5 Provisions subject to revision are now found as Arts. 7, 23, 26, 32, 58, 77, 80, 83, 177 of
Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Gongsifa (中华人民共和国公司法) [The Company Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated on 29 December 1993 and effective 1 July 1994, amended in 1999,
2004, 2005 and 2013) [hereinafter Company Law 2013], http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_
0_7.html. Art. 29 of the 2005 Company Law was abolished. See Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Gongsifa
(中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated on 29
December 1993 and effective 1 July 1994, amended in 1999, 2004, and 2005) [Company Law 2005], Art.
29, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zw/zcfg/fl/201206/t20120612_215532.html.
6 Liu (2013).
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prompting the growth of the private economy. Furthermore, portrayed as a
borrowing from the US legal capital regime, many also see this legislative change as
an infusion of Anglo-American liberal market values, hoping that it will cure
China’s enduring problems of administrative interference and multiple lines of
command over economic activities.7
Choruses of praise notwithstanding, the fit of these US-inspired legal capital rules
within the Chinese context thus far has not been given adequate thought. The
passage of these amended rules intrinsically rests upon the powerful metaphor of the
‘legal transplant’,8 holding that laws associated with advanced market economies
are an autonomous set of formal, apolitical rules unconstrained by political and
cultural borders, which can function and bring about analogous market development
in developing countries, just as in the case of China.9 Indeed, both the process and
the content of China’s 2014 legal capital amendments implicate transplanting
attempts: the US Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA) was
explicitly referred to as a good model of law on capital provision in the process
of this legislative reform, and the finalized version of the revision bears strong
imprints of the RMBCA enabling setting, by striving to provide maximum elasticity
to equity claimants by the elimination of capital provision restrictions.10
In the meantime, one has to appreciate that even today under the ever-increasing
force of globalization, in many aspects China remains a metaphor for notable dif-
ference, distinct from its Western counterparts: the fact that State-owned Enterprises
(SOEs) continue to dominate primary and pillar industries of the economy and enjoy
privileges in various aspects challenges key assumptions of the free market
economy and the hegemony of economic liberalism.11 Rooted in Confucianism and
reflecting Marxist theory, the dominant instrumental view of law as a means of
securing the reign of public ownership of the means of production, represented and
exerted by the Party-State, also sets its face against the ‘multibillion-dollar rule of
law’12 concept that Western legal scholars have come to hold dear. Scholars have
developed widely touted labels such as the ‘Beijing Consensus’, a ‘China Model’, or
‘Chinese exceptionalism’13 to encapsulate China’s unique mode of development.
Although the provenance of such uniqueness remains debatable, it has been
contended that the ideologically inspired Party-State control over economy and law
is one major factor in the list of distinctive ‘Chinese characteristics’.14 The fact that
transplanted legal capital rules are embedded in a complex economic, political and
7 Ibid.
8 Teubner (1998).
9 Gillespie (2002), p 644; Lan (2014), p 367.
10 Liu (2013); Cui (2014), p 151; Zhao (2014), p 19. For discussions of the benefits of the US capital
provision regime, see Enriques and Macey (2001), p 1173.
11 John Williamson, ‘The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development’, a lecture in
the series ‘Practitioners of Development’ delivered at the World Bank, 13 January 2004.
12 Peerenboom (2010a); Tomasic (2015), p 285; Grosman et al. (2016), p 201.
13 E.g. Kennedy (2010); Breslin (2011), pp 1323–1324; Tang (2016); Naughton (2010).
14 Peerenboom (2006), pp 825–826.
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ideological system that is unique and distinct from its Western counterparts provides
compelling reasons for rethinking their practical effectiveness.
Building upon and complementing existing doctrinal research on legal capital
reform, this paper aims to explore in depth the fit of the US-inspired legal capital
rules in the Chinese corporate law context from doctrinal, ideological, and practical
perspectives, and to shed some new light on the contentious debate of legal
transplantation from China’s legislative amendment experience. On a broad
spectrum, decades of research have yet to arrive at a coherent view of the general
theme of legal transplantation, with two main schools of thought forming the polar
extremes of the discourse. On the one hand, advocates hold to the rhetoric of the
mobility of law, suggesting that ‘the amount of innovation in law is small and
borrowing and imitation is of central importance in […] the course of legal
change’.15 Endorsed by multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the World
Bank, core commercial law principles and governance structures associated with a
mature market-oriented economy are regarded by convergence theorists as
universally applicable.16 While not explicitly stated, the mobility of law hints at a
formalist understanding, viewing laws as autonomous, apolitical rules that can be
applied by neutral judges, unconstrained by either national, political or cultural
borders.17 This nomadic vision of law also works to combat the criticism of
developed countries interfering with the internal affairs of developing nations—
after all, legal transplantation is more a matter of borrowing for developing
countries and an exportation process for advanced economies. As such, contem-
porary legal transplantation discussions tend to focus on subjects in the private law
realm, so as to marginalize the social and political embedding of legal transplants.
Rules on the raising and maintenance of capital, emulating the market-based
ideology that commercial law is not a political form of law, are thus well received as
part of the transplantation package.18
A contrasting theme, originating from Montesquieu’s thesis,19 perceives law as a
‘fait social total’20 that cannot supersede cultural boundaries. This school of thought
was reinforced by the development of path dependence theory, which advocates
long-lasting national systematic differences in the ideological, institutional, and
economic compositions of home and host countries.21 As such, mobility opponents
do not hesitate to use strong vocabulary to denote transported rules in the host
context, describing them as ‘contaminants’22 or ‘irritants’23 to the host country’s
15 O¨ru¨cu¨ (2006), p 206.
16 E.g. Hansmann and Kraakman (2000–2001). Black and Kraakman (1996).
17 Legrand (1997), p 112.
18 Ramsay (2001), p 572; Horowitz (1977), Chapter VII, p 211.
19 As Montesquieu commented, ‘The political and civil laws of each nation must be proper for the people
for whom they are made, so much so that it is a very great accident if those of one nation can fit another’.
De Secondat (2001); Orts (2001).
20 Mauss (1995), pp 274–275 quoted in Legrand (1997), p 116.
21 E.g. Bebchuk and Roe (2000).
22 O¨ru¨cu¨ (2006), p 210.
23 Teubner (1998), p 12.
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system. Meanwhile, it must be appreciated that even in the eyes of many
comparative lawyers who hold to Montesquieu’s thesis, sociological factors would
not impact on all transplanted subjects. There would likely be socio-cultural barriers
when transplanted laws relate to contextually-sensitive subjects, such as family law
in the private sphere and constitutional arrangements in the public realm.24
However, when it comes to corporate and commercial law, a matter ‘so very remote
from the sociological and cultural essentials of life’,25 Montesquieu’s contention of
the match between local conditions and the law will most likely lose its force.
While the fit of a transplanted foreign norm in general, and the applicability of
the US-inspired legal capital rules in China in particular, are matters of controversy,
which can lead to distinct conclusions of a half-full or a half-empty glass depending
on one’s subjective stance,26 at least three considerations help one gain an insight
into the fit and feasibility of legal transplantation. First, there is the issue of the
purpose of legal borrowing, i.e. the role that a transplanted norm is expected to serve
in the host country. Although some might imagine the needs of the borrowing
country to be the same as those of the source society, practice has shown that this is
rarely the case.27 Second, the borrowing society’s distinguishing economic,
political, and social institutions, which the transplant will be rooted in, are a
significant factor. A complex interplay between the transplant and socio-cultural
forces may well cause the transplant process to be far from straightforward. Third,
there will likely be additional consequences of the transplanted rule when it seeps
into the idiosyncrasies of the new legal environment, i.e. possible spillovers to
connecting areas. When the background social institutions are different, using
regularities and tendencies in the original context to predict future effects in a new
environment has often proved premature.28
As noted by a Chinese slogan: tiny clues help reveal the general trend.29 One
major goal of this paper is to subject the feasibility of legal transplantation to critical
scrutiny; and the recent legislative change surrounding legal capital in China will be
used to evaluate the conventional vision of ‘Commercial-law-as-bare-rules’30 with
regard to the above stated three aspects. Beginning with an overview of the doctrinal
disparities pertaining to legal capital between the US and China’s conventional
frameworks in Sects. 2, 3 affords a discussion of the national-specific imperatives
24 For instance, Kahn-Freund used Japan as an example in distinguishing commercial law and family law
subjects when it comes to the feasibility of legal transplantation. ‘Before the First World War Japan
adopted the German law of contract, of civil delict and of property, but the principles of family law only
with modifications, and even as modified, we are told, they largely failed to mould the “law in actual
operation” as distinct from the “law in books”’. Kahn-Freund (1974), p 7.
25 Ibid., at p 4.
26 O¨ru¨cu¨ (2002), p 209; Clarke (2006), p 1, ‘At what point do we say that a norm is so new, and its source
so different, that it counts as a transplant into a particular body of law, and not simply an internal
development of that body of law?’.
27 Clarke (2006), p 2.
28 Bix (2012), p 16.
29 I.e. Jian Wei Zhi Zhu (见微知著). Zhang and Wang (2014), p 96.
30 Legrand (1997), p 114, ‘[…] Anyone who believes in the reality of “legal transplants” must […]
accept, in particular, a “law-as-rules” and a “rules-as-bare-propositional-statements” model’.
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underpinning the trajectory of legal capital reforms in China. The socio-economic
agendas associated with the 2014 reform are set out in detail, illustrating the
political-economic dynamics of corporate law making in China. Section 4 focuses
on the doctrinal perspective, and examines the fit of 2014 legislative amendments to
existing legal settings, and potential loopholes generating therefrom. Section 5
examines the force of socio-cultural specialties in shaping the distinct nature of laws
in a comparative manner, in particular, the roots of the instrumentality view of law
and the State centrality underpinning the process of the 2014 legal capital reform in
China, in contrast to the US orbit where the transplanted rules originated. Section 6
sketches the contours of potential spillovers resulting from the latest legal capital
reform within the national-specific embeddings discussed in Sect. 5—or, in
metaphorical language, practical irritations resulting from transplantation. Section 7
offers further reform suggestions and the last section concludes. Although the latest
legal capital reform is envisaged to stimulate private entrepreneurship and liberalize
the economy as it does in advanced market-based economies, viewed through a
broader socio-economic lens it functions as part of a relatively well-trodden,
measured sequence of State-led reforms of the economy in China,31 distinct from
the economic liberal wisdom from which these transplanted arrangements derived.
Conventional ideological and institutional factors specific to the Chinese socio-
economic setting also affect the functions of these transplanted rules, making them
unlikely to become fully purposive.
2 The Trajectory of Legal Capital Reforms in China
2.1 An Overview of the Conception of Legal Capital
Company law in almost every jurisdiction makes certain implicit assumptions: that
the limited liability of shareholders creates a tension between their interests and
those of creditors; that this tension cannot be fully resolved by contractual means
between the two sides; and that corporate directors are tempted to maximize the
interests of shareholders by expropriating creditors, particularly when the company
is approaching insolvency. From this point of view, mandatory arrangements in
relation to legal capital initially came to light as a reaction to the inauguration of
limited liability and the disturbed equilibrium between the interests of shareholders
and creditors.32 These rules were justified as the price paid by shareholders for their
access to limited liability—or, from the creditors’ perspective, a trust fund held by a
limited liability corporation to discourage shareholders’ opportunistic conduct, in
exchange for the loss of their right to hold shareholders personally liable for debts.33
31 This has been termed ‘economic Statism’ in certain literature sources. E.g. Breslin (2011), p 1327;
Kennedy (2010), p 461.
32 Kohl (1999), p 196.
33 Wood v. Dummer 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D.Me. 1824). This ‘trust fund’ argument has lost much of its
appeal in the contemporary US owing to two major concerns. First, it is argued that the initial amount of
share capital cannot reflect either post-incorporation changes to corporate assets, or the actual financial
condition of the firm. It thus bears no relevance to either the business reality or the intended protection of
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The main utility of legal capital mandates was thus claimed to protect creditors,
preventing the unlawful transfer of assets from the company to its members.
While there are many legislative and practical variations, available legal capital
mandates have been mainly structured around two pillars: the principle of capital
provision, i.e. shareholders must make genuine and adequate capital contributions to
the company in the manner they promise in the articles of incorporation; and the
principle of capital maintenance, i.e. the company must not distribute assets to the
shareholders to the detriment of the creditors.34 Viewed from the company’s
perspective, capital provision ensures a proper inflow of share capital into the
company, and capital maintenance prohibits the unlawful outflow of assets from the
company. In addition to the plethora of laws embodying these two themes,
minimum capital thresholds are prescribed in certain jurisdictions, requiring a
minimal amount of registered capital from shareholders at the time of incorporation.
The practical effectiveness of such thresholds depends heavily on the integral
enforcement of laws governing the provision and maintenance of capital, though the
implementation of the latter two aspects is relatively independent of the presence of
a minimum threshold, an arbitrary figure prescribed by law.
2.2 Doctrinal Disparities between Two Major Legal Capital Frameworks
In conjunction with a multitude of economic and social developments, contempo-
rary views on legal capital have gradually polarized around two major camps,
classifying the ideal types of company laws into those which are enabling and those
which are regulatory.35 The first camp, represented by the United States and the
United Kingdom, generally emphasizes the enabling role of company law, arguing
for the autonomy of private entrepreneurs and thus the demise of mandatory
restrictions on the provision and maintenance of capital.36 While the UK is still
Footnote 33 continued
creditors, because of its primitive and inaccurate indication of the company’s ability to pay its debts.
Second, the restraining effect of minimum capital on startup companies can be massive. As entrepreneurs
who are unable to satisfy the minimum threshold will not be able to benefit from limited liability, this
creates practical barriers to market entry and indirectly favors existing firms by reducing their competitive
pressures. This view of restraining startups stands at odds with the Anglo-American liberal ideology of
‘competition in a free market’. See Enriques and Macey (2001), p 1166; Hassen (2009), p 73.
34 Allen et al. (2009), pp 139–140; Armour (2000), p 365.
35 This categorization to a large extent connects with the taxonomy of corporate law and governance
systems in comparative literature. The Anglo-American system, generally regarded as including the
United States and the United Kingdom, and the Continental system exemplified by Germany, are
commonly seen as forming the two polar extremes. E.g. Williams and Conley (2005); Toms and Wright
(2005). Anglo-American company laws are generally regarded as more liberal, allowing entrepreneurs to
order their affairs with minimal State interference. This is in stark contrast to the prescriptive nature of
Continental laws. Sealy and Worthington (2010), p 52. Although legal capital settings in English law
remain primarily enabling for private companies, stricter rules are in place for public companies
following the Second EC Company Directive requirements. For the purpose of this article, US laws as
regards legal capital will be primarily employed when discussing the enabling ideology of company law.
36 E.g. Department of Business, Innovation & Skills (2012), p 5: ‘The company law framework is
enabling’.
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obliged to retain certain capital restrictions in line with EU requirements,37 the
depletion of mandatory capital provision rules has reached its pinnacle in the US,
the RMBCA being a typical example. Concepts of stated capital and par value have
been criticized as ‘outmoded’38 and abolished, rendering the question of watered
stock, i.e. the inadequacy of consideration for shares, largely a dead issue in the eyes
of US lawyers.39 When it comes to appraising in-kind payments, the RMBCA,
honouring party autonomy, affords the conclusive right of determination to the
board of directors without asking for independent expert valuation.40 An evident
overvaluation of an in-kind asset is seen as a matter for shareholders rather than for
creditors, which may be corrected by ex post court review as the result of an action
filed by shareholders.41
Likewise, ‘the simplest of all the modern statutory limitations’42 to capital
maintenance can now be found in the RMBCA, and they are all broadly constructed
as restrictions on dividend distributions, considering their functional equivalence on
the company’s balance sheet.43 The scope of distribution is widely defined to
include not only traditional cash dividends, but virtually all transfers of money or
other property to a shareholder.44 On paper these distribution restrictions are
supposedly premised on dual equity and balance sheet standards, revealing the
lynchpins of corporate financial status—assets and cash flow.45 In the meantime,
entrepreneurs are afforded flexibilities to get around these mandatory restrictions,
hinting at the enabling rather than restraining nature of corporate laws. For instance,
in determining whether corporate assets suffice to make distributions under this dual
test, the RMBCA grants boards wide discretion, permitting them to rely on either
37 These EU mandatory restrictions on legal capital mainly concern public limited liability companies.
See Council Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on
Coordination of Safeguards which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are required
by Member States of Companies within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Art. 54 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, in respect of the Formation of Public Limited Liability
Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, with a view to Making such Safeguards
Equivalent Text with EEA Relevance, Preamble (3) and Art. 1, [2012] OJ L 315 [Council Directive 2012/
30/EU].
38 Committee on Corporate Laws (1979), p 1867, suggesting the abolishment of the ‘outmoded concepts
of stated capital and par value’ and liberalized rules on profit distribution and share repurchases.
39 Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.21 (b) and (c), stating that shares can now be issued for
consideration ‘consisting of any tangible or intangible property to benefit to the corporation’, and the
board of directors are to decide ‘that the consideration received or to be received for shares to be issued is
adequate’.
40 Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.21 (c).
41 E.g. Lewis v. Scotten Dillon, 306 A 2d 755 (1973). As remarked by Lindley LJ in Re Wragg, ‘The
value paid to the company is measured by the price at which the company agrees to buy what it thinks is
worth its while to acquire’. [1897] 1 Ch 796, p 831.
42 Bainbridge (2002), pp 78 and 776.
43 Cox and Hazen (2003), §§ 20.09–20.10; Enriques and Macey (2001), pp 1179–1180.
44 Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 1.40 (6) and § 6.40 Official Comment 2.
45 One is the balance sheet test, which commands an excess of assets over liabilities and the claims of
preferred shareholders after the proposed distribution; the other is the equity insolvency test, requiring
that the company has sufficient liquid assets to meet its debts and liabilities as they become due in the
following period. Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 6.40 Official Comment 2–4.
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the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) or ‘a fair valuation or other
method that is reasonable in the circumstances’.46 The latter practically allows a
corporation to write up assets to reflect an increase in their fair market value, and
thus to pay a dividend despite the present state of the firm’s balance sheet.
In stark contrast to the enabling approach adopted by the RMBCA, mandatory
legal capital rules existing as ex ante creditor protection in Continental European
regimes spring from the civil law family’s great respect for legislation,47 and reflect
civil law’s reluctance to leave potential deficient company formation ‘to the hazards
of litigation’.48 In the case of China, the conventional 1993 Company Law regime,
exemplifying the formal and obligatory civil law approach, also largely held on to
mandatory ex ante legal capital rules: all registered capital had to be specified in the
articles and fully paid up prior to the time of incorporation,49 and in-kind
contributions had to be professionally valued to match the par value of the shares.50
Meanwhile, advocating many idealized functions of minimum capital, including
creditor protection, transaction security, and enhancing State control over the
economy,51 the 1993 Chinese Company Law also imposed rigorous thresholds of
between RMB 100,000 and RMB 500,00052 as part of the rules governing the
raising of initial capital. Given that the average wage of a formal employee in China
in 1995 was only RMB 5500 per annum,53 these capital thresholds prescribed in the
1993 Company Law were out of reach for most ordinary Chinese people who
wished to start their own businesses, largely thwarting the growth of private
economy.
In addition to ex ante capital provision mandates, capital maintenance rules were
also set in a meticulously doctrinal manner in China’s 1993 Company Law,
spreading from traditional distribution prohibition54 to categorized restrictions on
the reduction of share capital,55 the company’s purchase of its own shares56 and
shareholders taking back their investment.57 Stringent requirements also confined
the scope of assets subject to dividend distributions: the losses of previous years
were to be made up by current profits; 10% of the company’s after-tax profits were
to be drawn out as the company’s statutory common reserve; and another 5–10% of
46 Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.40 cmt. b.
47 Dainow (1967), p 424.
48 Kahn-Freund (1974), p 65.
49 Companies Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., 29 December 1993, effective 1 July 1994) [hereinafter Company Law 1993], Art. 25.
50 Ibid., Art. 24.
51 Wang (2012), p 177.
52 Company Law 1993, above n. 49, Art. 23.
53 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Database—Average Wage of Formal
Employees by Sector (end of 1995), http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1996e/
D4-26e.htm (accessed 18 July 2015).
54 Company Law 1993, above n. 49, Art. 177.
55 Ibid., Art. 186.
56 Ibid., Art. 149.
57 Ibid., Art. 34.
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the company’s profits were to be set aside as the company’s statutory welfare
reserve for employees, all before any distribution could be made to shareholders.58
The scope of corporate assets subject to capital maintenance restrictions in China
was thus much wider than its counterpart under the RMBCA, in the sense that a
substantial amount of the company’s profits would not be available for distribution,
even after satisfying the US dual adequate solvency tests.
2.3 Reforms to the Legal Capital Regime in China
After the inauguration of the 1993 legal capital regime, detailed rules concerning
capital provision have undergone two further reforms in 2005 and 2014 to
encourage private entrepreneurship, as China has moved to reform its socialist
economy to be more responsive to market forces. Two key aspects of the 2005
company law reform notably evidenced such pro-market inclination: (1) the
minimum capital thresholds lowered considerably, from at least RMB 100,000 to
RMB 30,000;59 and (2) a significant reduction of the amount of initial capital
contribution was also seen—from full initial subscription of the registered capital to
no less than 20% to be contributed at the time of corporation.60 The latest 2014 legal
capital changes went further in liberalizing capital formation, bearing the hallmarks
of the US RMBCA enabling ideology in three major aspects. First, the traditional
regime based on paid-in capital has now changed to one based on subscribed capital,
with minimum paid-in thresholds completely discarded.61 Second, forms of capital
contribution have also been made more flexible and variable by completely
removing the cash contribution threshold—investors are now entitled to make full
in-kind capital contributions at their discretion, including IP rights, domain names,
equipment and so on.62 Furthermore, a significant streamlining of the administrative
requirements is also seen—detailed information in relation to capital contribution,
including the unpaid amount of share capital, the amount to be paid up at the time of
registration, and the time period for each shareholder to pay up his subscribed
capital, is no longer required to be checked by Industry and Commerce authorities
or recorded on the business license.63 The conventional requirement of an
independent verification report submitted to the registration authority for each
capital injection is no longer necessary either, leaving the right of determination of
the value of in-kind capital contributions completely to the business judgment of the
board.64
58 Ibid., Art. 177.
59 Company Law 2005, above n. 5, Art. 26.
60 Ibid., Art. 26.
61 In the US, mandatory capital provision rules have by and large fallen into disuse, with RMBCA
completely abolishing concepts of stated capital and par value. Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.21,
Official Comment.
62 Company Law 2005, above n. 5, Art. 27; Company Law 2013, above n. 5, Art. 27. For the RMBCA
perspective see Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.21 (c).
63 Company Law 2013, above n. 5, Art. 7.
64 Company Law 2005, above n. 5, Art. 29, now removed by the Company Law 2013. Also Revised
Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.21, Official Comment.
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3 Goals of Legal Transplantation—The Instrumentality of Legal Capital
Reforms in China
3.1 A Formalist Uniﬁcation of Law
As one of the basic pillars encouraging private entrepreneurship and market
competition, the trajectory of legislative reforms concerning legal capital in China
demonstrates the increasing inclination of Chinese company law towards the Anglo-
Americanmarket-orientedmodel, alongside other reforms of company law.65 Against
the backdrop of the Law and Development Movement which has dominated in past
decades, seeking to promote an international order of economic and social institutions
similar to those inmore advanced economies,66 some scholars suggest that the first and
foremost purpose of such burgeoning borrowing activities inChina is to prepare for the
international unification of law amid globalization.67 Indeed, it is hard to overlook the
enthusiasmofChinese legislators learning from theWest, in linewithChina’s position
poised to engage more with the world economy.68 Appreciating that the nation’s
relative lack of experience of marketization has not been adequate to distil a complete
set of normative standards in the field of company and commercial law, it was also
logical for Chinese lawmakers to turn to legal systems in mature market-oriented
economies for inspiration. Drawing on laws from the US, a representative country of
theWestern advanced economies, the reform of legal capital rules is thus commended
(and hoped) by legislators as one of the forward steps towards conforming to
international business standards in advanced market economies. As remarked by
Junhai Liu, a scholar sitting on the legislative committee, the 2014 legislative change
surrounding capital provision is both necessary and urgent in the sense that ‘it is
already more than thirty years later than the reform in the US’.69
3.2 The Instrumentality of Legal Capital Lawmaking in China and Political-
Economic Dynamics of the 1993 and 2005 Reforms
While appreciating the force of globalization in inducing legislative changes and the
inherent formalist view of law that legal transplants associated with the market-
based economy can induce analogous market reforms in developing countries,70 one
65 Another significant company law field that exerted an increasing Anglo-American influence is
directors’ duty. See Xi (2006), p 28.
66 Ginsburg (2000), p 829; Tamanaha (1995), p 471.
67 Kahn-Freund has identified three prime purposes of legal transplantation, namely, ‘first, with the
object of preparing the international unification of the law, secondly, with the object of giving adequate
legal effect to a social change shared by the foreign country with one’s own country, and thirdly, with the
object of promoting at home a social change which foreign law is designed either to express or to
produce.’ Kahn-Freund (1974), p 2.
68 Allen et al. (2005), pp 57–116, at p 64.
69 ‘Gongsifa Xiugai Ersan Yan’ (公司法修改二三言) [Several Comments on the Reform of Company
Law], (2014) 10 Pinming, http://www.civillaw.com.cn/Article/default.asp?id=60050. See also Li (2015),
p 193.
70 Gillespie (2002), p 644.
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should not undermine analytical rigor by eliding the force of complex contextual
specifics in China. These are displayed in the political-economic dynamic and the
instrumental nature of corporate law making, best summarized by Chairman Zedong
Mao: ‘[laws are] instruments with which one class oppresses another […] They are
violent and certainly not “benevolent things”’.71 This is particularly the case in the
field of legal capital. Given its anticipated effect in accelerating private economy
growth, the rhetoric of reforming, and particularly of removing, restraints on capital
provisions potentially stands at odds with the overriding political theme of China—
Marxist-Leninist socialism. In an ideal Marxist communist society, the concept of
private ownership of the means of production would be abolished because of its
basis in ‘class antagonism, on the exploitation of the many by the few’.72 The
concept of property will eventually be conferred a social character and converted
into common holdings of all members, so as to do away with personal
appropriation.73 During the Maoist era (from 1949–1978, the so-called first thirty
years of China’s development), Chinese Communists mainly emphasized the
ideological differences between communism and capitalism, and the roles of states
and markets were heavily politicized and branded as the ‘Socialist East’/‘Liberal
West’ conflict, or as part of the ‘long if often dubious history’ of ‘East–West
comparisons’.74 For this reason, Chinese law relating to enterprise organizations
barely existed prior to the 1978 economic reform.75 Given their affiliation with the
development of private business enterprises, classified as ‘capitalist forms of
industrial organizations’,76 the concept of legal capital and accompanying company
law provisions were nowhere to be found during the Maoist period, and did not enter
into China’s legal system until 1993, owing not least to the politically sensitive
nature of this subject.
In the late 1970s China initiated an overall economic turnaround towards a market-
based paradigm led by the Party-State.77 This economic policy shift was inventively
71 Zedong Mao (1927) ‘Hunan Nongmin Yundong Kaocha Baogao’ (湖南农民运动考察报告) [The
report on Hunan peasant movement], http://www.china.com.cn/guoqing/2012-08/29/content_26367138.
htm.
72 Marx and Engels (1996), pp 102–105.
73 As stated by Marx and Engels, ‘[…] [T]he theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single
sentence: Abolition of private property.’ Ibid., pp 102 and 103.
74 Peerenboom (2003), p 2.
75 Clarke (2006), at p 4. For this reason, private business activity was practically out of law for decades in
China since the Communist Party took over in 1949. Prior to the 1978 economic opening up, the only
economic sector allowed was public ownership, with the State-owned economy accounting for 77.6% and
the Group-owned economy accounting for 22.4%. See ‘Duozhong Jingji Chengfen Bingcun’ (多种经济
成分并存) [The Existence of Many Types of Economic Sectors], in The Summary of China 2007, http://
www.china.com.cn/aboutchina/zhuanti/2007zgjk/2007-11/12/content_9214613.htm.
76 Clarke (2006), at p 3.
77 Chaobin Wang, ‘Cong Jihuajingji dao Shehuizhuyi Shichangjingji de Weida Biange’ (从计划经济到
社会主义市场经济的伟大变革) [A Great Transformation from the State-Planned Economy to Socialist
Market Economy], 11 Xinxiang Review (2008), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/127229/127250/
8344596.html (accessed 18 July 2016). At the Plenary Session of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee in 1984, the central committee indicated that the ownership and management of state-owned
enterprises may be appropriately separated. This was codified in 1988, in the Law on Industrial Enter-
prises Owned by the Whole People. See Art and Gu (1995), pp 278–279.
S. Wen, J. Zhao
123
justified by the accompanying ideological development emphasizing another aspect of
Marxist theory, i.e. economic determinism describing the correlation between the
material ‘base’ and the ideological structure of a society that embraces all political,
legal, and cultural institutions.78 Since the opening up and reform in 1978 (or the
second thirty years, as it was described by the Chinese press), socio-economic
development in China has exhibited an interesting trend. While many elements of the
Chinese economy, including the acceptance of foreign investment, the corporatization
of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the proliferation of the private economy, are
endeavouring to resemble the USmarket-oriented regime, at least in form, in ideology
these business features initiated and developed in capitalist countries are still justified
under the basic tenet of the Communist Party of China, namely Party-State-led
socialism.79 The State still structures and leads the process of growth, channels capital,
and guides the activities of private actors.80 Themaking and unmaking of legal capital
rules in China and the pace of subsequent reforms, including the initial 1993mandates,
subsequent relaxations concerning capital formation in 2005, and the acclaimed 2014
landmark move to the RMBCA enabling mode, have had a strong instrumental
character, inevitably connecting to major shifts in economic policy developed and
carried out by the State.81
The 1993 and the 2005 legal capital developments corresponded with and served
the economic needs in the initial two stages of China’s so-called Socialist Market
Economic Reform.82 The first stage started in 1993, the central theme being the
establishment of a market economy while preserving the dominating socialist
theme.83 In this general climate, the major goal of the first Company Law, passed in
1993, was to oil the wheels of the State-owned sector and enable struggling State-
owned firms to raise capital from the general public, rather than to encourage the
growth of private economy.84 Additional to the usual Equity Cushion function, the
presence of a set of stringent rules on legal capital, particularly restrictions on
capital provision, was viewed as an effective means of restricting the development
of the private economy. Meanwhile, reflecting the view of Marxism that law serves
as an ideological instrument of politics,85 these rules in legal capital also reinforced
78 Wacks (2012), p 179.
79 Peerenboom (2010b), p 91. ‘China’s reforms have been successful due in large part to the
government’s pragmatic approach and willingness to resist, selectively adopt, and adapt as needed the
ideologically driven prescriptions offered by Western states and international donor agencies.’
80 Ginsburg (2000), p 836.
81 Kennedy (2010), pp 461–462.
82 ‘China’s Socialist Market Economic Reform and Its Strong Theoretical Consciousness and
Confidence’, People’s Daily Online, 17 October 2012, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/100668/
102793/7980397.html.
83 ‘Zhonggongzhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehuizhuyi Shichangjingji Tizhi Ruoganwenti de Jueding’ (中
共中央关于建立社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [The Decision of the CPC Central Commit-
tee on Issues Concerning the Establishment of the Socialist Market Economy], adopted at the Third
Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC on 14 November 1993, http://finance.ifeng.
com/opinion/jjsh/20090906/1199906.shtml.
84 Chen (2003), p 451.
85 As put by Tushnet, in favor of the Marxist spirit, ‘law is politics, all the way down’. Tushnet (1991), p
1526.
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the sanctity of Party-State power in China—companies had to satisfy requirements
imposed by the State before acquiring their legal personality and limited liability
benefits. Towards these ends, Chinese lawmakers unsurprisingly chose to emulate
stringent ex ante capital provision rules in the 1993 Company Law regime set out in
the section above, rather than the enabling mode evidenced in RMBCA.
The second stage of China’s economic development began in 2003, with the
central policy imperative evolving to become the so-called Improvement of the
Socialist Market Economy.86 The position of private business improved markedly
during this stage, formally legitimized as part of the Socialist Market Economy that
China was heading towards.87 Accompanying the subtle shift in policy attitude from
repressing to encouraging the private economy sector, company law in China was
modified accordingly, from primarily emphasizing the governing function towards
increasing reception of the market-based ideology and advocating the enabling role
of company law. It is thus no coincidence that the 2005 company law reform was
triggered and implemented immediately after the 2003 economic policy shift,88
symbolizing the country’s commitment to encouraging private entrepreneurship in
the market economy.
3.3 The Socio-Economic Agendas of the 2014 Reform
As presented above, a contextual rather than textual view of the 1993 and 2005
legislative moves relevant to legal capital helps to appreciate the primary nature of
laws as ‘an instrument’ in a measured sequence of State-led reforms in China, which
is different to the US legal configurations serving the economic liberalism ideal.
Likewise, as will be examined in Sect. 5, the 2014 reform was more of a top-down
move ‘forced’ by the government. Viewed from the doctrinal perspective, the 2014
legal capital reform was not as urgent and necessary as the 2005 one—the RMB
30,000 minimum threshold in the 2005 regime no longer constituted a significant
barrier to the establishment of private businesses.89 The instrumentality of the 2014
legislative revision thus needs to be sought in consideration of China’s immediate
socio-economic agendas and immediate needs identified by the government, as
detailed below.
86 ‘Zhonggongzhongyang Guanyu Wanshan Shehuizhuyi Shichangjiji Tizhi Ruoganwenti de Jueding’
(中共中央关于完善社会主义市场经济体制若干问题的决定) [The Decision of the CPC Central
Committee on Issues Concerning the Improvement of the Socialist Market Economy], adopted at the
Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC on 14 October 2003, http://news.
xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2003-10/22/content_1136008.htm. Accessed 18 July 2016.
87 Ibid.
88 Calcina Howson (2010), p 136.
89 The number of private enterprises in China has risen rapidly from 23.5 million in 2004 to 40.6 million
in January, 2013, implicating the enabling effect of the 2005 company law framework. See ‘China Has
40.6 Million Private Businesses’, MarketWatch, 10 February 2013, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/
china-has-406-million-private-businesses-2013-02-10; Li (2015), p 184.
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3.3.1 Stimulating Private Entrepreneurship and Liberalizing the Economy—
Demands of the Economic Structural Transition
Aswith previous reforms, the primary aimof the 2014 reform identified by theChinese
government was still economically founded, i.e. ‘to foster economic development’ by
way of stimulating the private sector.90 Undeniably, the rate of economic growth in
China in the past decades has been incredible—starting from scratch, the Chinese
economy hasmanaged an average 10.06% annual growth since the economic opening-
up in 1978,91 and even during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis that led to the
worst worldwide economic recession in seven decades, China’s economy still
managed above 7% annual growth.92 In the meantime, the unsustainability of the
State-investment-led, export-oriented model and an urgent need for economic
structural reforms was openly acknowledged by the Chinese leadership as early as
2007.93 This heavy reliance on exports has always been a ‘chronic illness’,94 but its
harmful impact began to be really felt around the end of the last decade after the
worldwide crisis, when the general economic decline in world markets led to a
significant fall in export demands and a rise of labour costs in China. Although steps
were taken during the Hu-Wen administration, the first and foremost task facing the
new generation leaders, led by Jinping Xi as the new Communist Party and military
chief sinceMarch 2013, remained an engineered structural shift towards newmodes of
development, based less on exports and more on domestic growth and markets.95 The
desired shift entails a move away from largely state-run heavy industry to more
entrepreneurial and services-led growth, which is mainly provided by the private
sector.96 Taking as a given rather than as an assumption that start-ups and SMEs are
powerful economic drivers, the Chinese government has concluded that this cannot be
achieved without more private capital investment. Inextricable from the microeco-
nomic ideal that ‘[…] every small business is a potential Microsoft’,97 the abolition of
90 State Council, Guowuyuan Guanyu Yinfa Zhuce Ziben Dengji Zhidu Gaige Fang’an de Tongzhi
[Notice of the State Council on the Issuance of the Reform Plan to Amend the Registered Capital
Registration System], Guofa (2014) No. 7, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-02/18/content_2611545.htm.
91 See World Bank Data with authors’ calculation, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.
KD.ZG?locations=CN.
92 Statistics China, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth-annual.
93 ‘A country that appears peaceful and stable may encounter unexpected crises. There are structural
problems in China’s economy which cause unsteady, unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable
development’. Remarks from Premier Jiabao Wen’s Press Conference of 17 March, 2007. Full text is
available at http://www.chinaconsulatesf.org/eng/xw/t304313.htm.
94 Ding Xueliang, ‘Watch Out for the Chronic Illness of the China Model’ (警惕中国模式的‘慢性病’),
Nanfang Zhoumo, 31, 9 December 2011.
95 ‘To solve the long-term challenges of economic development in China, we must implement structural
reform, even though we may let our economy grow at a lower rate.’ Remarks made by President Jinping
Xi at the first session of the G20 leaders summit in 2013, after he assumed power in March. See Jing Fu,
Jiao Wu and Songxin Xie, ‘Xi Vows Economic Reform’, Chinadaily, 6 September 2013, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2013-09/06/content_16949683.htm.
96 Kevin Yao, ‘China Needs the Private Sector to Step Up’, Reuters, 16 May 2016, http://www.reuters.
com/article/us-china-economy-investment-idUSKCN0Y60V4.
97 Ramsay (2001), p 569.
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market entry requirements by way of modifying capital provision rules is thus
portrayed by the new Chinese leaders as apposite at this point of time, to encourage
investment in start-up companies and further prompt the growth of private economy.
Thismotive has been repeatedly asserted byChina’s recent official discourse, inwhich
the words ‘small start-up businesses’ and ‘competitive and innovative’ are frequently
linked together.98 As remarked by Premier Li, the legal capital legislative amendment
is timely to ‘support smaller businesses, especially innovative enterprises’.99
Additional to stimulating domestic start-ups, this enabling-style reform also
portrays the new government’s determination to liberalizing the economy, and
bringing to an end the practice of administrative orders superseding free markets.
This works to combat common criticisms targeting China’s impenetrable legacy of
administrative control, thereby boosting investors’ confidence in China’s investment
environment, and providing another powerful thrust for continuing economic
growth.100
3.3.2 Relieving Unemployment Pressures and Maintaining Social Stability
While seemingly unconnected, the legislative change in capital provision also
serves the purposes of relieving the massive unemployment pressures brought about
by the upcoming economic reform and maintaining overall social stability. The fast
speed of economic growth in China over the past few decades has come at a price—
uneven investment and development of industrial sectors, additional to the
overreliance on exportation as identified above. Since early 2000s the problem of
excessive industrial production capacity has been evident, with excess capacity and
utilization rates constantly below 80% in major industries over the past fifteen
years.101 This issue has only become worse since the 2008 economic stimulus
programs—to avoid massive business collapses and unemployment the central
government injected RMB 4 trillion into the economy, with local governments
launching their own stimuli with about RMB 13 trillion.102 With demand from
export markets falling considerably during and after the 2008 global financial crisis,
much of the above-stated economic stimulation focused on domestic construction,
in the hope of increasing domestic capacity for steel, cement, and aluminium.103
With production capacities under arbitrary stimulation, the excess problem has
become particularly acute when construction programs slowed down—since 2012
eight key industries, including steel, coal, cement, glass, oil, petrifaction, iron, and
98 Xiang Yangge and Ping Liu, ‘State Council Announce Significant Company Registration System
Reform’, 14 November 2013, http://www.mondaq.com/x/274880/Insolvency+Bankruptcy/State+
Council+Announce+Significant+Company+Registration+System+Reform.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Mamta Badkar, ‘China Stimulated Its Economy Like Crazy after the Financial Crisis… And Now the
Nightmare Is Beginning’, Business Insider, 17 June 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/chinas-excess-
capacity-problem-2013-6.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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non-ferrous metals, began to show negative growth in their Producer Price Index.104
Up to December 2015, over 80% of the businesses in these eight industries were
making losses.105
Under the current State-led economic reform agenda, the story gets more
complicated: despite the fact that many businesses in these overproducing industries
lack commercial viability, the Chinese government has been reluctant to let them go
and has forced banks to continue injecting money into them,106 because: (1) the
potential consequences of mass unemployment and social instability could be
devastating; and (2) many businesses in these overproducing industries are SOEs
and have objectives other than profit maximization, for instance social services, tax
revenues, and so on.107 Accompanying the continuing financial support of these
loss-making companies has been the common phenomenon of Chinese courts
refusing to accept SOE bankruptcy claims.108 An undesirable yet unavoidable
consequence of these two policies is the mass appearance of ‘zombie companies’ in
these overproducing industries, i.e. economically unviable businesses which ‘have
been kept alive long after they should have died thanks to money poured in by
governments and banks’.109 In the meantime, the increase of non-performing loans
and bad debts generated by these businesses has placed huge pressures on Chinese
banks, leading to a ‘cash crunch’ crisis in the past few years. As statistics reveal,
China’s corporate debt market is now the world’s largest at $14.2 trillion, and it is
still expanding ‘at a lightning-fast rate’.110 With ‘the banks […] short on cash, [and]
the stock market and small- and medium-sized enterprises […] short on cash’,111 the
liquidity squeeze in Chinese banks eventually led to a sharp spike in interbank rates
offered in June 2013—from below 3% to a sudden record high of 30%.112
Facing these tough economic and financial situations, it is no wonder that the new
government has placed the elimination of excess capacity as a top priority on its
economic agenda. This task understandably requires measures in multiple fields; but
one focal point, as set out by the Chinese government in one of its economic work
priorities, is to clear ‘zombie companies’ in these overproduced industries, so as to
104 ‘Closing the Zombie Companies! The Central Government Is Concerned with Millions of
Unemployment’, 31 December 2015, http://www.pcpop.com/doc/1/1595/1595302.shtml.
105 Ibid.
106 Matthew Boesler, ‘China is Mass Producing “Zombie Companies” and They are Eating Away at the
Economy’, Business Insider, 21 August 2012, http://www.businessinsider.com/bofa-china-zombie-
companies-hitting-chinese-economy-2012-8.
107 Zheng (2010), p 666.
108 Statistics suggest that the average annual number of bankruptcy cases in China is less than 0.2% of
that in the US, and the number of SOE bankruptcy cases is almost negligible. ‘Why Courts Refuse to Let
State-Owned Zombie Enterprises Go Bankrupt?’, Phoenix Finance, 28 March 2016, http://finance.ifeng.
com/a/20160328/14293875_0.shtml.
109 Du Juan, ‘“Zombie Companies” Adjust to New Reality’, China Daily, 15 March 2016, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016twosession/2016-03/15/content_23865916.htm.
110 Sophia Yan, ‘Debt-Laden “Zombie” Firms Threaten China’s Economy’, CNN News, 19 October
2014, http://money.cnn.com/2014/10/19/news/economy/china-corporate-debt/index.html.
111 Fayen Wong, ‘China’s Cash Squeeze Caused by Shadow Banking’, Reuters, 23 June 2013.
112 Zi Mo, ‘Credit Crunch’, China Pictorial, 1 August 2008, http://www.chinapictorial.com.cn/en/
industry/txt/2013-08/01/content_558892_2.htm.
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improve efficiency and innovation.113 However, this is easier said than done. In
addition to the reluctance of various levels of governments to close down zombie
SOEs in their own regions,114 an unavoidably thorny issue following the reduction
of industrial overcapacity would be unemployment—as predicted, in the coal and
steel industries alone at least 1.8 million workers will have to be laid off, which
could trigger severe social instability if not tackled properly.115 At its worst, it could
even threaten the legitimacy of the Communist Party-State leadership position. This
has been proved by the occurrences of public demonstrations in China—although
some have called for human rights improvements, the majority of the demonstrators
were primarily motivated by economic concerns.116 The latest legal capital reform
also emulates the government’s eager interest in relieving pressures of unemploy-
ment and enhancing social solidity, in the hope that the relaxation of capital
provision requirements would be followed by an anticipated increase of employ-
ment opportunities, generated from further expansion of private businesses brought
about by the reform.117 More job opportunities will help with the maintenance of
social order and relieve immediate unemployment pressures on the Chinese
government following the economic restructuring reform—while reducing zombie
companies is important for the sustainable development of the economy, it could
also become a source of unrest if unemployment rises exponentially.118
4 A Doctrinal Appraisal of the 2014 Reform
Commendable legislative objectives notwithstanding, the actual workings of the
legal transplants need to be examined from both doctrinal and contextual
dimensions. This part, consisting of two sub-parts, devotes itself to the former
matter—the doctrinal fit of the transplanted rules to existing legal settings in China
and the potential loopholes generating therefrom.
113 Lan Lan and Yangpeng Zheng, ‘Zombie Companies May Receive Help to Shut Down’, China Daily,
7 November 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-11/07/content_22834865.htm. As noted
by Liu He, vice-chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission which plays a pivotal
role in shepherding China’s economic reform agenda, shutting down these unprofitable companies is a
necessary step towards market-oriented reform and the upcoming supply-side adjustments. Lan Lan,
‘“Zombie Companies” Should be Weeded Out’, China Daily, 19 October 2015, http://usa.chinadaily.com.
cn/epaper/2015-10/19/content_22220063.htm.
114 Lan Lan and Yangpeng Zheng, above n. 113.
115 CCTV, ‘China Strives to Ease Employment Pressure while Reducing Excessive Capacity’, 1 March
2016, http://english.cntv.cn/2016/03/01/VIDEZUl1rJKufjB7k5JmD7Hx160301.shtml.
116 Peerenboom (1993), p 30.
117 The private sector in China has been performing well in terms of job creation—it generated almost all
new urban jobs in the past decade, and now employs about four fifths of urban workers. ‘The China that
Works’, 12 September 2015, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21664143-if-
economic-miracle-continue-officials-must-give-private-sector-more-freedom.
118 Yojana Sharma, ‘What Do You Do with Millions of Extra Graduates?’, BBC News, 1 July 2014,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28062071.
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4.1 Merits of the Reform
The main doctrinal merit of this latest reform is its diminution of the practice of
shareholders illegally taking away their contributed capital, which was a persistent
problem before the 2014 reform. Under the 1993 and 2005 legal capital regimes,
which were both equipped with statutory minimum capital thresholds, entrepreneurs
who intended to benefit from the corporate form and limited liability protection but
who were unable or unwilling to meet the stipulated entry bar of incorporation
tended to withdraw their contributed amount shortly after their injection of capital
and the successful incorporation of the company. Both the 1993 and the 2005
regimes attempted to deal with this deceitful behaviour with a sweeping yet vague
prohibition: once a company was registered, its shareholders could not withdraw
their capital contributions.119 However, nowhere did the Chinese statute map out
this provision, for instance, in terms of guidance as to the time frame or the actual
behaviour that would be classified as an illegal withdrawal of capital.120 All past and
present events were therefore scrambled together without regard for their current
economic significance. Over the years doctrinal ambiguities have resulted not only
in judicial inconsistencies, but also in restrained applications of this prohibitive
provision. Case judgments prior to the 2014 reform have suggested that only the
most clear-cut behaviour, e.g. an unjustifiable withdrawal of a cash contribution
within seven days of capital registration, would be classified as taking away capital
illegally.121 Meanwhile, other doubtful behaviour with analogous effects of capital
shrinkage, such as transferring in-kind contributions to another company’s
registered place without proper consideration shortly after incorporation, would
likely survive judicial challenges.122 The 2014 company law reform attempted to
solve this problem—it is now possible for entrepreneurs to start a company and
enjoy the privileges associated with the corporate form with an initial capital
contribution as little as RMB 1, which means that they will generally lose the
impulse of injecting and then withdrawing the capital shortly thereafter to get past
the minimum threshold prerequisites.
119 Company Law 1993, above n. 49, Art. 34.; Company Law 2005, above n. 5, Art. 36.
120 The only document to offer a modest clarification on this matter came seventeen years later, with the
Judicial Interpretation III issued by the Supreme People’s Court prescribing three specific circumstances
of ‘illegally taking away capital’. Meanwhile, the time frame of shareholders ‘illegally taking away
capital’ remains unidentified. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghuarenmingongheguo
Gongsifa Ruogan Wenti de Guiding San (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题
的规定(三)) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application of
the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (III)] (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court,
issued on 27 January 2011, revised and effective on 1 March 2014), Art. 12.
121 E.g. Zhengzhong Su Henan Nianfu Shiye Fazhan Youxiangongsi deng Zhaiquanren Liyi Jiufen An (郑
忠诉河南年富实业发展有限公司等债权人利益责任纠纷案) [ZhengZhong v. Nianfu Industry Develop-
ment Co. Ltd] (2014 Heminerchuzi No. 8;(2014) 鹤民二初字第8号) (on file with the authors); Enshi
Zizhizhou Hengrong Sujiao Zhipin Youxian Zeren Gongsi deng yu Yu Zuoyuan Gudong Chuzi Jiufen
Shangsu An (恩施自治州恒熔塑胶制品有限责任公司等与余作元股东出资纠纷上诉案) [Hengrong
Plastic Co. Ltd v. Yu Zuoyuan] (2013 Eenshizhongminzhongzi No. 00662(2013) 鄂恩施中民终字第
00662号) (on file with the authors).
122 E.g. Hengrong Plastic Co. Ltd v. Yu Zuoyuan (2013), ibid.
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4.2 Doctrinal Defects
While resolving the issue of shareholders illegally taking away capital, the 2014
reform has brought a few more pragmatic problems, with two particularly standing
out, as set out below. The doctrinal incompatibilities and loopholes that follow are
partly attributable to the legal transplanting tactics in China—because China’s legal
borrowing discourse is largely driven by shifts of policy imperatives, it is stopgap
and sporadic rather than constituting a set of coherent practices, reflecting the
nation’s changing policy needs.123 As will be explored in Sect. 5, the dominance of
this pragmatic approach of selective adoption builds upon Marxist jurisprudence
that sees law as a means to State economic and political ends. This instrumental
approach in the meantime often leads to the result that only urgently-needed foreign
rules in a confined area are transplanted, and then in a fragmented state, leaving
some necessary complementarities out of the picture.
4.2.1 Lack of Strategies to Tackle Dwarf (Empty Shell) Companies with Nominal
Share Capital
The first problem that surfaced following the 2014 reform is the appearance of so-
called ‘dwarf companies’ or ‘empty shell companies’, namely companies with only
a nominal amount of registered capital.124 While shareholders in these companies
limit their personal liability to the maximum extent, the risks associated with
corporate operations are purportedly transferred to creditors under the interest
equilibrium discussed in Sect. 2. In practice it is hard for this type of company to get
sufficient loan capital for corporate operations, unless the borrowing is ex ante
secured by way of shareholders’ personal guarantees or security on corporate assets.
The issue of unsecured creditor protection thereby stands out: while secured
creditors might be able to satisfy their mortgage or other lien interests in assets of
the corporate debtor when these dwarf companies go into liquidation, unsecured
creditors, most of whom are involuntary in nature, are almost guaranteed a zero
return. In the US where minimum capital thresholds have been abolished, there
normally exist court-based or statutory prescribed defences for disgruntled creditors,
giving courts the ability to subordinate all or part of any secured or unsecured
claims of dominant shareholders who sought to shift the risks to other creditors by
using nominal share capital.125 For instance, the US judiciary first set its face
against the loan claims of controlling shareholders as opposed to those of other
creditors in an insolvent subsidiary company by way of introducing the
123 The short development period of Chinese law and the lack of experienced draftsmanship also
contribute to this type of ‘simple and rudimentary’ style of legal transplantation. See discussions in Liu
(2014), p 34.
124 Peizhong Gan, ‘The Legal Capital Reform Cannot Be One that Leads to More Bubbles’, speech at the
Application of Company Law Symposium, Beijing, 11 May, 2014, http://www.guancha.cn/ganpeizhong/
2014_05_16_230053_s.shtml.
125 The equitable subordination doctrine works to this effect. For instance, in the UK categories of
deferred debts are normally prescribed by statutes, e.g. the Insolvency Act 1986 s. 74(2)(f). Also, Soden v.
British & Commonwealth Holdings Plc [1998] AC 298.
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equitable subordination doctrine.126 Likewise, it was the US judicial force which
substantially refined the restrictions on share redemptions.127 When minded to do
so, US judges have made endeavours to acknowledge the substance of a situation
rather than be constrained by the narrow formality of the corporate form. However,
in China this kind of ex post protective mechanism for creditors is not yet in place—
nowhere in any existing laws or documents with regulatory effects can one locate a
similar provision with the effect of subordinating a dominant shareholder’s claim in
a situation of competition between himself and a creditor who is not a member of
the bankrupt company. Likewise, the broad reach of other areas of law in the US
serving to curb practices of hindering, delaying, or defrauding creditors, e.g. the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,128 which conveniently fills the gap left by the
deregulation in ex ante legal capital,129 is also absent in the current Chinese law
context, creating further loopholes in involuntary creditor protection.130
In light of the doctrinal loopholes mentioned above, the Supreme People’s Court
(SPC) recently made a novel attempt to introduce the US-originated equitable sub-
ordination principle into the Chinese context, by way of issuing a Typical Case and
indicating that this principle might be used if helpful.131 However, there is reason to
be sceptical about the effect of such recourse, after revisiting the nature of the
equitable subordination principle and the standing of Typical Cases in China. For a
number of years the SPC has been selecting and publishing cases in various fields as
supplementary interpretations to the broadly-worded basic laws of China, ‘to
126 Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 US 307 (1939), which has established the
equitable subordination doctrine, i.e. the so-called ‘Deep Rock Doctrine’ working as a defense against
the claims of parent companies or other dominant stockholders in bankruptcy and reorganization
proceedings.
127 E.g. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 328 N.E. 2d 505 (Mass 1975), refining the restrictions on selective
purchase of shares in a close company context. Essentially, majority shareholders in a close company are
not allowed to create a market for their own shares, without extending the same treatment to the minority.
In contrast, selective repurchases by a public corporation are generally shielded from judicial review by
virtue of the business judgment rule. Bainbridge (2002), p 783.
128 On a different note, fraudulent transfer law in the eyes of US scholars also bears a contractarian
nature honouring party autonomy, ‘representing one kind of the control that creditors generally would
want to impose and that debtors generally would agree to accept’. See Baird and Jackson (1985), p 836.
Fraudulent transfer laws have existed in the UK for years, based originally on bankruptcy law.
129 The key purpose of fraudulent transfer law is estate preservation, and the law works to invalidate
transactions that have the effect of decreasing the (corporate) debtor’s net worth and impairing the rights
of its creditors. Liss (1987), pp 1496 and 1499. This is much in line with the main theme of European ex
ante capital maintenance mandates, which unfortunately were nowhere to be found in current Chinese
company law.
130 A prominent example is the statutory restriction on financial assistance provided to third parties who
have acquired company shares. While not grounded on ex ante legal capital mandates, as was the case in
Europe, much of the US case law drawing on the Fraudulent Transfer Act has equally recognized that this
kind of transfer made to benefit third parties is ‘not made for fair consideration’. This sheds important
light on correcting corporate creditors’ misfortunes, particularly in cases of crafted leveraged buy-outs
where corporate assets are indirectly returned to target shareholders by means of ‘asset stripping’. Liss
(1987), p 1499. See also Credit Managers Ass’n v. Federal Co., 629 F. Supp. 175, 182 (C.D. Cal. 1986);
In re Christian and Porter Aluminium Co., 584 F. 2d 326, 337 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gleneagles
Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
131 ‘Shagang Co. v Kaitian Co., published by the Supreme People’s Court’, 31 March 2015, http://www.
court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-14000.html.
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effectively restrain judicial discretion and to ensure the universal application of
laws’.132 Cases selected and published by the SPC are currently divided into several
categories, comprising Guiding Cases, Important Cases, and Typical Cases, none of
which have the authority of laws. According to the SPC, only the Guiding Cases
present ‘guiding effects’, i.e. lower courts should make reference to and could quote
from these cases when judging cases of the same kind. Meanwhile other types of
published cases, including Typical Cases, have ‘indicating effect at the most’ and
cannot be quoted by lower courts.133 The fact that the case involving the
equitable subordination principle was published as a Typical Case rather than the
more forceful Guiding Case indicates the cautious attitude or the tied hands of SPC
in terms of introducing this principle.
Furthermore, as famously stated, ‘general propositions do not decide concrete
cases’.134 Even in common law countries, the equitable subordination doctrine is
often characterized by issues of an intensely factual nature, and is in need of detailed
guidance and elucidation in application.135 It was through cumulative judicial
applications over the decades that the scope and conditions of this principle
gradually became comprehensible, on the basis of the doctrine of stare decisis.136 In
the meantime, China’s civil law system stands at odds with the practice of
honouring judicial precedents as established case law, and law-making is viewed as
a task for the NPC, the State Council, and various levels of government, rather than
for the courts.137 It was largely because of this particular concern that an early SPC
attempt to introduce the equitable subordination doctrine was thwarted.138
Furthermore, the published Typical Case that made reference to the equitable sub-
ordination principle loyally follows the conventional style of civil law judgments,
132 ‘Guiding Cases are issued by the SPC’, Xinhua Daily Telegraph, June 3 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/mrdx/2015-06/03/c_134292583.htm.
133 Long Bai, ‘Zuigaofa Fabu Shoupi Zhidao Anli Zuowei Shenpan Yiju’ (最高法发布首批指导案例作
为审判依据) [SPC Issued the First Batch of Guiding Cases for Judicial References], Renmin Daily, 21
December 2012.
134 Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 at 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
135 The usage of the equitable subordination doctrine often involves the determination of issues of highly
factual nature—for instance, whether or not the plan or transaction which gave rise to a claim carries the
earmarks of an arm’s length bargain under all circumstances, and whether the corporation was grossly
undercapitalized. Pepper v. Litton, 308 US 295 (1939); Costello v. Fazio 256 F.2d 903 (9th cir. 1958).
Zhao (2013), p 3.
136 I.e. judicial decisions being both the source and the proof of the law. Dainow (1967), p 425.
137 According to the Legislation Law of the PRC, the National People’s Congress (hereinafter the NPC)
enacts ‘basic laws’, the State Council (the head of the executive branch of the government) endorses
‘administrative laws’, and provincial and sub-provincial governments can issue mandatory ‘local
regulations’ and ‘local rules’. Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China, effective from 1 June
2000, Art. 7.
138 As far back as 2003, the SPC in one of its draft regulatory documents—Provisions on Several Issues
concerning the Hearing of Cases involving Corporate Disputes—attempted to introduce the equitable sub-
ordination principle by way of Art. 52: in cases where a controlling company abuses the separate
personality of its subsidiary company, the controlling company should subordinate its debt claims to other
creditors of the subsidiary when the subsidiary company goes into the bankruptcy process. However, the
Provisions never entered into force owing to the concern that this factual-based common law doctrine
would not fit into the Chinese civil law context.
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being abstract and general, with previous cases not cited or analysed. The entire
published Typical Case, consisting of background facts, judgments, and the SPC’s
own interpretations, was less than 1,500 words, with a cautiously brief statement
mentioning rather than explaining the equitable subordination doctrine: ‘while laws
in our nation have no comparable provisions, the equitable subordination doctrine
established in the US law has certain implications in terms of judging this case’.139
There was no interpretation of the factual situations under which the doctrine is
applicable, the proper way of subordinating shareholders’ claims to other creditors,
nor even an explanation of the conception of equitable subordination, regardless of
the fact that the provenance and applicability of this doctrine are not without
contestation, even in common law jurisdictions with the support of various case
precedents. The level of generality at which this equitable subordination doctrine is
pitched likely becomes a fertile ground for further disputes and inconsistencies, not
to mention the fact that lower courts are not bound to follow the Typical Case.140
Without detailed guidance, it is foreseeable that even if the equitable subordination
doctrine is to be used by lower courts in China to solve creditor-shareholder
conflicts in dwarf companies, judicial inconsistencies would inevitably follow.
Understandably, in the absence of these complementary creditor protection
means, Chinese judges rely heavily on the one and major ex post creditor protection
means in Chinese company law—the veil-piercing doctrine enshrined in Article 20
(3) of the Company Law. However practice has proved that thus far the application
of this doctrine in China has led to suboptimal results.141 Firstly, veil-piercing thus
far has been selectively applied—it never occurred in State-Owned enterprises,
owing to the following reasons: (1) veil-piercing could be ideologically construed as
a threat to the dominance of State ownership, which goes against the long-
established Chinese socialist economy ideology; (2) enforcing veil-piercing in SOEs
can be thorny, as ownership rights attached to State-owned assets are enforceable
only by the State Council, local governments, and State-owned Asset Supervision
and Management Commissions.142 Secondly, in the private companies’ context,
veil-piercing applications suffer from inconsistencies and overuse.143 While the
detailed factual instances under which the veil-piercing remedy might be invoked
remain debatable, it is agreed, not only in the West but also among Chinese
legislators, that this remedy is an exception rather than the norm, and that it should
139 Shagang Co. v. Kaitian Co., published by the Supreme People’s Court, 31 March 2015, http://www.
court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-14000.html.
140 Similarly, in a draft commercial case judgment guidance prepared by the SPC in April 2016, there
was an article purporting to introduce the equitable subordination doctrine. However, this again merely
confirms the applicability of the equitable subordination doctrine in bankrupt companies, without any
specific guidance as to its provenance or the conditions triggering its application. See SPC, A Summary of
Commercial Case Judgements Conference, 28 April 2016, not yet published and on file with the authors,
Art. 5: after a company begins its bankruptcy process, debt claims of the controlling shareholders or other
actual controllers of the company should subordinate to claims of other ordinary creditors.
141 Wen (2014).
142 Qiye Guoyou Zichan Guanli Fa (企业国有资产管理法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on
the State-Owned Assets of Enterprise] (promulgated by the National People’s Congress, 28 October 2008,
effective 1 May 2009), Art. 4. See also Wen (2104), pp 334–340 for detailed discussion.
143 Wen (2014), pp 345–353.
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be applied with extreme caution, for its potential destruction of the basis of modern
company law—the separate legal personality of the corporation.144 However, this
doctrine has been practically applied as a panacea rather than an exception in almost
all the conflicts between shareholder and creditor, despite the fact that some clearly
do not fall into the scope of Article 20(3) of the Company Law.145 Furthermore, in
cases concerning capital provision in dwarf companies, the application of this
doctrine would not provide effective redress to unsecured creditors under the current
Chinese law—SPC limits the liability of shareholders who fail to pay in capital to
the amount they have failed to pay into the company,146 even though this type of
case was invariably treated by Chinese courts as abuse by shareholders of the
corporate form and Article 20 was triggered.147 Thus, in the context of dwarf
companies with a small amount of registered capital, the compensation unsecured
creditors could obtain from shareholders would be nominal under existing legal
settings, even based upon successful veil-piercings.
4.2.2 Problems Surrounding Scoundrel Companies with Enormous Unpaid Share
Capital
If the growth of dwarf companies can still be interpreted as an inevitable conse-
quence following the removal of minimum capital thresholds and the
encouragement of private entrepreneurship, new pragmatic problems now surfacing
in China associated with enormous amounts of unpaid share capital are largely
caused by the defective doctrinal details of the 2014 amendments. One rhetoric
underpinning this legal capital reform is to create an operating environment where
companies can ‘register easily but operate under strict supervision’.148 While the
registration process has now become a lot more user-friendly, the expected ‘strict
supervision’ over capital contribution and maintenance largely remains rhetorical:
the right of determining the value of in-kind capital contributions and the obligation
144 As stated by Min Liu, a judge sitting on the SPC, ‘between the separate legal personality doctrine and
the piercing doctrine, the former undoubtedly presides. What merits special attention in judicial practice
is that we cannot easily refute the limited liability of shareholders in the name of creditor protection.
Simply put, we cannot overuse the doctrine of piercing the veil’. See Min Liu, ‘Faren Renge Fouren
Zhidu zai Ge’an zhong de Shenzhong Shiyong’ (法人人格否认制度在个案中的慎重适用) [A Cautious
Application of the Veil-Piercing Doctrine], Guidance and Reference to Civil and Commercial Judgements
in China 1 (2005), http://www.civillaw.com.cn/article/default.asp?id=29016.
145 The overall rate of veil-piercing in China has so far been significantly higher than in other countries,
and the number is still rising annually. Huang (2012), p 3. See also Wen (2014), pp 343–344, for
examples of misapplications of veil-piercing.
146 Arts. 13 and 14 of the Third Regulation of the SPC on Several Issues in the Application of the PRC
Company Law, promulgated by the SPC on 6 December, 2010. The SPC might impose this limit on the
basis that the unpaid capital amounts as outstanding amounts due on the shares. However, this limit
purportedly contradicts the ideal of veil-piercing, under which shareholders undertake unlimited liability.
In other situations where Chinese courts have applied Art. 20, such as the commingling of shareholder
and corporate funds, no such cap has been placed on shareholder liability. Hawes et al. (2015), p 10.
147 See the empirical study conducted by Hawes et al. (2015), p 8.
148 Moxiao Tan and Jun Dong, ‘The Facilitation of Corporate Registration Requires Governments to
Enhance Supervision’, Xinhua Net, 23 September 2014, http://finance.china.com.cn/news/gnjj/20140923/
2693037.shtml.
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of checking the authenticity of capital contributions are left completely to the board,
who often submit to the will of shareholders.149 Information asymmetry further
prevents outside stakeholders, particularly creditors who are affected the most by
this legislative change, from overseeing boards’ decision-making and corporate
operations in China. After the 2014 legislative change, detailed information in
relation to capital contribution, including the unpaid amount of share capital, the
amount to be paid up at the time of registration, and the required time period for
each shareholder to pay up his subscribed capital, is no longer required to be
recorded on the business license,150 which is often the only official document that
unsecured creditors can have access to. Although these capital contribution details
are recorded on the Articles of Incorporation, in current practice the Articles of
registered companies are kept at local Industrial and Commercial Bureaus and are
only available to those who have the company’s written permission, or to lawyers
who act for that particular company. For outside creditors who wish to challenge the
arrangements and practices of capital contribution, accessing the Articles is
pragmatically difficult, if not impossible.
In relation to realizing the State Administration for Industry and Commerce’s
(SAIC) pledge of ‘easing market entries whilst reinforcing governance (of firms)’
and eliminating information asymmetry between internal corporate controllers and
outside creditors, an Enterprise Credit Management Information System was
recently set up to provide various stakeholders with more clarity and better access to
information relevant to the company.151 However, the actual effect of this system is
doubtful to say the least. The information recorded on the Credit Management
System is categorized into Registration Information, which is required by Industry
and Commerce authorities; and Public Information, which is disclosed purely at
enterprises’ discretion.152 Most essential financial information, such as the total
assets and liabilities of the company, total sales, and shareholders’ equity, is within
the realm of Public Information and thus is disclosed at the enterprises’ discretion.
In current practice the only Registration Information disclosed on the system
concerning legal capital is the amount of registered capital and the names of
shareholders, the same as the information recorded on the business license.153 Other
essential information, including the amount of actual injected capital, the paying-up
period, and details of each shareholder’s capital subscription and actual capital
149 Company Law 2005, above n. 5, Art. 29, now removed by Company Law 2013.
150 Company Law 2013, above n. 5, Art. 7.
151 See http://gsxt.saic.gov.cn/ for further details. The operation of this system is governed by Qiye Xinxi
Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli [Temporary Rules for Public Disclosure of Information by Enterprises], State
Council Order No. 654, effective from 1 October 2014. The Chinese version is available at http://www.
gov.cn/zhengce/2014-08/23/content_2739774.htm.
152 Qiye Xinxi Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli (企业信息公示暂行条例) [Temporary Rules for Public
Disclosure of Information by Enterprises], ibid., Art. 9.
153 In the current Credit Management System, it is stated in the column for ‘shareholder information’ that
‘information relevant to shareholders’ capital contribution is updated until 28 February, 2014. Afterwards
the Industry and Commerce authorities only disclose the names of shareholders. All other information is
disclosed at the enterprises’ discretion.’ See http://gsxt.saic.gov.cn/ for further details. Accessed 15
January, 2017.
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injection, is disclosed in the form of businesses’ annual reports, and authorities will
only choose a small amount of sample companies to check the authenticity of such
information.154 To make things more complicated, the responsibilities for checking
the authenticity of information and penalizing those who fail to make the required
disclosures are confusingly spread among several government organs at various
levels, whose scopes of authority obscuringly overlap.155 The methods and scope of
such random checks also remain undefined, leaving considerable gaps in imple-
mentation.156 This has provided new loopholes for the manipulation of fraudsters, as
evidenced by the notorious investment company fraud case that occurred in the city
of Changchun in 2015.157 A number of fraudsters lawfully registered eighteen
investment companies to engage in P2P financing business, each with RMB 30
million or RMB 50 million registered capital, but RMB 0 paid-up capital at the time
of registration. As the business licenses and the Enterprise Credit Management
Information System available to the public only showed the amount of registered
capital in these companies, which at face value seemed financially competent, the
fraudsters managed to borrow nearly RMB 100 million from hundreds of investors
before their escape, resulting in huge losses for investors and widely adverse social
impacts.158
Apart from the increase of fraudulent activities, the upsurge of so-called
Scoundrel Companies, i.e. companies featuring a high amount of registered
capital, nearly nil paid-up capital at the time of registration, and an extremely long
subscription period,159 have also become a common phenomenon after the 2014
legal capital reform. The undercapitalization status of these companies has
brought difficulties not only to creditors, but also to shareholders of the
companies. Under China’s current corporate and bankruptcy laws, if a company
with unpaid share capital cannot satisfy creditors’ debt claims and the unpaid
share capital is not yet due, creditors do not have direct legal recourse against the
particular shareholder whose subscribed capital is not yet due, but need to first
apply to the court for the bankruptcy of the company, and then the liquidator must
demand the particular shareholder to fulfil the capital provision obligation despite
the subscription period provision in the Articles.160 Needless to say, it is a lengthy
154 Qiye Xinxi Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli (企业信息公示暂行条例) [Temporary Rules for Public
Disclosure of Information by Enterprises], State Council Order No. 654, effective from 1 October
2014, Arts. 14–15.
155 See Qiye Xinxi Gongshi Zanxing Tiaoli (企业信息公示暂行条例) [Temporary Rules for Public
Disclosure of Information by Enterprises], ibid., Arts. 5–8.
156 Xu (2015), p 24.
157 Wu Hao, Hanqi Meng, ‘18 Investment Companies Gathered Money and Ran Away: Whom Did the
0RMB Companies Trick?’, China Daily, 2 July 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/micro-reading/dzh/
2015-07-02/content_13914834.html.
158 Ibid.
159 Peizhong Gan, ‘The Legal Capital Reform Cannot Be One that Leads to More Bubbles’, speech at the
Application of Company Law Symposium, Beijing, 11 May 2014, http://www.guancha.cn/ganpeizhong/
2014_05_16_230053_s.shtml.
160 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of China, adopted at the 23rd meeting of the
Standing Committee of the 10th National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on 27
August 2006, promulgated and coming into force as of 1 June 2007, Art. 5.
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and difficult process for creditors of the company to eventually get their claims
fulfilled, if they ever do.161
It would not be fair to say that the difficulties that corporate creditors face after
the 2014 reform have gone completely unnoticed. In the recently drafted
Commercial Case Judgement Guidance prepared by the SPC, the undercapitaliza-
tion status of the company was singled out in Article 6 to be tackled by courts via
piercing the corporate veil and asking the shareholder to bear joint liability with the
company. As stipulated in Article 6:
If the capital subscription period provided in the Articles of Association is
notably long, or the actual injected capital of the company is notably
incompatible with the operation scale and risks of the corporation, corporate
creditors’ veil-piercing claims on the basis of Art. 20(3) of the Company Law
should be supported.162
However, this proposed approach contradicts the well-accepted legislative and
judicial reiteration of the separate legal personality of corporations, as discussed
above.163 If Article 6 were to be put into implementation, an unwarranted effect
would be shareholders in all dwarf companies with a nominal amount of registered
capital being exposed to the risk of unlimited personal liabilities, as this type of
company, save for those not engaging in actual business, neatly fits the description
of actual capital being incompatible with their operational risks.
Additional to the difficulties for creditors, the huge discrepancy between
registered capital and actual injected capital in scoundrel companies has also
generated new types of legal disputes between shareholders, as shown in two
recent cases in Guangdong province.164 The defendants in both cases agreed to
subscribe for more than 60% of the share capital, payable within five years of
registration, as provided in the Articles of Incorporation. Registered in mid-2014
after the promulgation of new legal capital provisions, both companies had
actually received RMB 0 injected capital from the defendant shareholders at the
time of registration. The claimants of both cases, being shareholders of the
concerned companies who had already made their respective capital contribution,
sought for the defendants to expedite their share capital contribution, claiming that
their companies experienced serious financial difficulties and could not run
properly owing to the undercapitalized status caused by the defendants’ non-
contributions. Both claims were rejected by the courts on the basis of party
autonomy—as the subscription periods stipulated in the Articles were not yet due,
both defendants’ non-contribution behaviour, although causing serious distress for
corporate operations and other shareholders, was nonetheless lawful under Chinese
company law. If the shareholders wished to resolve the situation, the only option
161 Peizhong Gan, above n. 159.
162 SPC, A Summary of Commercial Case Judgements Conference, above n. 140.
163 Above n. 144 and relevant texts.
164 Ruan Jiahao v. Chen Weiguo,阮嘉豪诉陈卫国股东出资纠纷案, (2015)珠香法民二初字第 285号,
(2015) Zhuxiangfamin’erchuzi No. 285; Baohe Furniture Co. Ltd v. Liu Saiya东莞市葆和家具有限公司
诉刘赛亚股东出资纠纷案 (2015) 东二法民二初字第 171号 (2015) Dong’erfamin’erchuzi No. 171.
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for them under the current Chinese law regime would be to apply for the
dissolution of the company,165 which would completely thwart the purpose of
their investment. Furthermore, even in these two similar cases judged by courts in
the same province, there is inconsistency. It was stated in the Ruan Jiahao Case
judgement that if the claimant shareholders had proved that the company was
indeed in financial difficulties caused by the defendants’ behaviour, the claim
would have been supported. However, the judgment of the Baohe case reached a
completely different conclusion, stating that proofs of the financial difficulties of
the company and the causation link were irrelevant to the claim. This hints at
mounting judicial confusion in the field, owing to the lack of authoritative and
detailed guidance.
5 The Soil in Which the 2014 Transplants Take Root—Socio-Cultural
Embeddings and Implications
As suggested by Robert Cover, ‘(an appreciation of law should not be) merely a
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live’.166 As shown by the
national-specific agendas of legal capital reforms in China and their fit with existing
doctrinal settings, transplanted rules are more than mere inscribed words from
another jurisdiction, functioning as part of a new and larger cognitive framework
containing different idiosyncratic constructions.
Taking root in different socio-cultural soil, the actual workings of legal transplants
are also constitutive of the host country’s articulated values. After all, it is easy to
borrow rules, but it is difficult to transplant the history and the frameworks of the
intangibles behind the rules which gave birth to the inscribed words.167 Viewed on an
ideological spectrum, the debate about whether to utilize capital provision mandates
also consists of one strand of the larger State-meets-market dialogue, which is
endemic to the political economy of nations and corporations.168 Even in the post-
Cold War period today, different socio-political embeddings still impact on the
process and actual effects of the capital provision reforms, underlining the long-
lasting socio-cultural contrasts between the US and China. These socio-cultural
differences between host and home contexts in turn watered down the anticipated
functionality of the 2014 reform, particularly boosting the private economy and
injecting liberal market values, as will be presented in the following sections.
5.1 West (The US Orbit)
From the conceptual perspective, relaxing legal capital rules chimes with the
mainstream rule of law rhetoric in the US context, emphasizing both the
constraining effect of law on the State’s capacity and the discrete role of law in
165 Company Law 2013, above n. 5, Art. 182.
166 Cover (1983), pp 4, 5.
167 Clarke (2006), p 14.
168 Levi-Faur (1997).
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empowering private economic actors.169 Founded on Locke’s postulation of humans
as liberal beings with a natural right to defend ‘life, health, liberty or possessions’170
rather than affiliations of a State, the sanctity of individuals’ inherent rights has long
been honoured, and duties have often been presented as corollaries to rights.171
Indeed, a cursory look would discover that this rule of law conception based on
individual rights was echoed in many aspects of the American world. It was
reflected ‘in the political rhetoric of the “founding fathers” of the United States’;172
it prompted the inauguration of the American Declaration of Independence;173 it
resulted in the Constitutional divide of State power;174 and it also impacted on the
general common law tendency to give greater emphasis to the rights of the parties
than to State interests.175
Central to this rule of law notion is an autonomous pre-existing order of contract
and property prescription, to prevent undue expropriation by the State.176 Echoing
the views of economists that ‘whatever the State does, it should provide effective
institutions and processes to protect private property rights and enforce contracts,
which are considered prerequisites for investment and economic growth in market
economies’,177 while there had been heated intellectual debates in the legal
profession about the balance between regulation and market logic in the nation’s
history,178 the general attitude of the US RMBCA, particularly after the 1970s, has
not anticipated a large State presence in the enterprises it regulates.179 The fact that
company and commercial law creation and reform in the US are often pushed by
private groups’ lobbying efforts also to a large extent exemplifies this overriding
principle of party autonomy, evidenced in the rhetoric of ‘meeting the needs of
business practice’,180 such as abolishing minimum capital thresholds and other
restraints on corporate capital.
169 Ginsburg (2000), p 832.
170 Locke (1690), Chapter II, Sect. 6. Many consider that Locke’s theory of rights inspired the founding
of the United States, particularly the inauguration of the American Declaration of Independence. E.g.
Zuckert (1996), pp 73–85.
171 Peerenboom (1993), pp 39–43.
172 Orts (2001), p 88.
173 Redish and Cisar (1991), p 456.
174 The constitutional limitation of federal legislative power to the Congress has been confirmed and
applied in FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 US 86, 90 (1953); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1, 16–17
(1958); McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 US 79, 86–87 (1916) (Holmes, J.); Orts (2001), p 88.
175 Hartley (2009), p 344.
176 Lan (2014), p 385; Ginsburg (2000), p 833.
177 Prado and Trebilcock (2009), p 345; research also suggests that countries effectively protecting
property rights and resolving contractual disputes tend to have a more transparent and facilitative
environment in which capitalism can flourish. North (1991), pp 477–487.
178 See Purcell Jr (1969), pp 424–446 for a detailed examination of the trajectory of the intellectual
debate surrounding the subject of law in the US.
179 Clarke (2006), p 19.
180 Ramsay (2001), pp 566–567.
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5.2 East (China)
In stark contrast to the sanctity of party autonomy and the rule of law notion
underpinning the US orbit, the making and unmaking of capital provision rules in
China has had a strong instrumental and command character, functioning as part and
parcel of the State-led socio-economic reforms detailed in Sect. 3. As China’s
policies shift towards establishing a market economy, instead of being marginalized
as advocated by liberal theories,181 law as a tool of the State is becoming more
important. The State structures and leads the process of growth, channels capital,
and guides the activities of private actors via laws, with the purpose of establishing a
socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.
Though the instrumental and relativistic nature of the law spreading throughout
most of Chinese intellectual life bears certain similarities to Western realists’
conception of law as ‘an engine having purposes, not values in itself’,182 one must
acknowledge that the Chinese instrumental view of law grows out of its own
pedigree and jurisprudential logic, as will be examined in the sections to follow.
Furthermore, the mainstream State-central view in China has never been commonly
held in the US ambit because of the possibility of it turning into ‘a ruthless
totalitarianism’.183 Under a different orientation of law towards the State rather than
private ordering, the borrowed RMBCA configurations concerning capital provision
have understandably been contextualized in China, generating further practical
consequences unique to the Chinese context, which will be explored in Sect. 6.
5.2.1 Cultural Tradition: The Collective Nature of Confucianism
Prevailing within a continuous civilization for more than two thousand years,184 the
long-dominating Confucianism has had a strong effect in shaping China’s legal
traditions and jurisprudential thoughts. Through the lens of Confucianism, each
individual is an essential unit in multi-lateral social guanxi185 webs, with a pre-set
181 Ginsburg (2000), p 836.
182 Llewellyn (1930), p 464. The Chinese instrumental view of law differs from the thinking of Western
realists, in the sense that the Chinese view does not tend to reduce law to specific judicial decisions.
Purcell (1969), p 431.
183 Purcell (1969), p 439.
184 Jensen (1997), p 4.
185 Guanxi means personal connections or relationships, and renqing means reciprocity. Guanxi is a
central life philosophy for many aspects of Chinese life. The Chinese have turned the art of personal
relationships into a carefully calculated science, and there are people whose lives rely heavily upon
guanxi. There are arguable benefits of building an extensive guanxi network, such as reducing transaction
costs, operational uncertainty, information costs, contextual hazards and competitive threats. Other
benefits include enhancing institutional support, economic returns, business effectiveness, organizational
legitimacy, and strategic capability, in order to provide more efficient mechanisms for transactions by
acting as the catalyst for the development of new market channels and investment opportunities. See Mei-
Hui Yang (2002); Zhao and Wen (2013), p 381.
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hierarchical position and various societal duties to fulfil,186 rather than an isolated
being to whom ahistorical, universal rights may attach. Grand social harmony, in a
Confucian view, should be mainly attained via the establishment and maintenance
of stable relationships among individuals, by way of cultivating people with core
moralities and ethical propriety.187 While Confucianism does not overlook the
governing impact of law, law is viewed as an instrument inferior to the above stated
system of ethics, as law ‘could only discipline the evil, but not encourage the
virtuous’.188 Confucians believe that the basis of a stable, unified and long-term
social order is maintained through living according to civilized and cultured
principles that are generated through human wisdoms rather than the imposition of
strict law on individuals.189 Most importantly, in support of the social hierarchical
order, law was viewed by Confucianists as a tool used by the Emperor and
aristocrats to secure their power over the ordinary people and confer on themselves
special privileges, such that they couldn’t be arrested by judicial departments
without the Emperor’s special permission.190 The paternalism in Confucian values
indicates that the state has the knowledge necessary to rule the people, and will act
for the interests of the people.191 Therefore, a system of centralized hierarchical
governance was founded,192 and the well-known saying that ‘punishments are not
designed for the elites, and rights do not extend to ordinary people’193 is a typical
illustration of this hierarchical regime.
The long-standing dominance of Confucianism has dictated and continues to
impact on the uniqueness of modern Chinese legislative thought in three aspects.
The first of these is Chinese law’s emphasis on a person’s duties within a social
hierarchy, which is different to the US accentuation of the independence of
individuals and their intrinsic rights which stem ‘from the inherent dignity of the
human person’,194 as discussed in the section above. With a well-established
hierarchical system of governance and elaborate bureaucracies for drafting and
enforcing various legislations, the culture of worshipping authority has been deeply
186 Yeung and Tung (1996), p 55.
187 Huang (1999), pp 9–10; Keung Ip (2009), p 464.
188 ‘Fu Falingzhe Suoyi Zhu’e, Fei Suoyi Quanshan’ (夫法令者所以诛恶,非所以劝善) Lujia, ‘A
Discussion of Salt and Iron, Volume 10 (恒宽[盐铁论]卷十)’, quoted in Qu (2003), p 310.
189 Miles (2006), pp 305–306.
190 Such special privileges were available in many dynasties, beginning from the Han Dynasty and
extending throughout the Tang and Song Dynasties. Qu (2003), pp 225–235.
191 Hamilton (1990).
192 Haley (2006).
193 ‘Li Buxia Shuren, Xing Bushang Dafu’ (礼不下庶人,刑不上大夫). The Book of Rights (礼记·曲礼
上), http://www.guoxue123.com/jinbu/ssj/lj/003.htm.
194 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted and opened for signature, ratification
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23
March 1976, in accordance with Art. 49), 1.
Contextualizing Legal Norms: A Multi-Dimensional View of…
123
rooted.195 Second, the emphasis on human relationships cultivates mutual obliga-
tions and values in society, and in some aspects functions as a relation-based
governance system, as a substitute for the authority of written laws in China.196
Even today, the idea that ‘law is no more than human interactions’197 is still widely
held in Chinese society, indicating the persistence of Confucian collectivism. Third,
people are familiar with the instrumental idea of law being a governing tool of the
State, rather than the US rule of law rhetoric that emphasizes the restraining effect
of law on the State. The hierarchy of the Party-State over individuals is still
maintained on many fronts, and formally consolidated in Article 51 of the current
Constitution.198
After the new generation of leadership took power in 2013, President Xi and
other leaders began to pivot back to Confucian and other classical Chinese
philosophies in state governance and law, formally emphasising that the rule of
law must be combined with the rule of virtue, and that socialist legal norms must
integrate with traditional Chinese virtues.199 This helps to tactically justify the
supremacy of the Party amid China’s cultural specific context and the
authoritative interpretation of law, functioning as ‘a revised authoritarian party
apparatus dressed up in Confucian garb’.200 It also impinges on China’s own
interpretation of the notion of the rule of law, which emphasizes the ‘formal or
instrumental aspects’ of law,201 particularly the availability of predictable and
performable rules. This is in contrast with the wider understanding of the rule of
law prevailing in the West, which connects primarily to the American pattern of
liberal democracy underpinned by the tripartite division of power restraining
governmental powers.
5.2.2 Political Ideology: The Chinese Development of Marxism
The instrumental vision of law in China as an axiom rather than a school of thought
is also in line with the primary Chinese ideology of Marxism—a philosophy that has
long been discredited in the US. Central to Marxist theory is the idea of economic
determinism, describing the correlation between the material ‘base’ and the
195 Wang et al. (2012), pp 350 and 368.
196 White (2006), p 29.
197 I.e. ‘Falv Buwaihu Renqing’ (法律不外乎人情) [Law Is No More Than Human Interactions], Foshan
Daily, 6 November 2013.
198 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, amended in accordance with the Amendments to the
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China adopted respectively at the First Session of the Seventh
National People’s Congress on 12 April 1988, the First Session of the Eighth National People’s Congress
on 29 March 1993, the Second Session of the Ninth National People’s Congress on 15 March 1999 and
the Second Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 14 March 2004), [Constitution] Art. 51.
199 ‘Xi Stresses Integrating Law, Virtue in State Governance’, Xinhua Net, 10 December 2016, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-12/10/c_135895641.htm. The concept of Dezhi (in Chinese) or rule of
virtue clearly is a Confucian inspirational idea, emphasising that ‘all legal systems involve both ren zhi
(rule of man) and fa zhi (rule of law)’. Peerenboom (2015), p 60.
200 Carl Minzner, ‘How China’s Leaders Will Rule on the Law’, China File, 15 October 2014, http://
www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-chinas-leaders-will-rule-law.
201 Peerenboom (2002), pp 471–473.
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ideological structure of a society that embraces all political, legal, and cultural
institutions.202 Contemporary China developed this economic determinism of law,
stating that the foremost human right is the right to subsistence, which could only be
achieved under the leadership of the Party—the vanguard of the Chinese working
class, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation.203 For Chinese scholars, the
prime position of the Party-State in law, as well as the instrumental character of law
in pursuing economic policies, are justified by and echo the Marxist spirit of law.
Although the State and laws will eventually ‘wither away’ with the realization of a
communist society, during the current period of socialism, laws and legal
institutions are necessary in China to achieve social solidarity and promote the
economic and political imperatives of the Party-State.204 A defining hallmark of the
Chinese mode of governance has thus been its overriding Party-State control over
key economic sectors205—or, in the words of Breslin, ‘a State-led engagement with
globalization’.206 Though a separation of enterprise and administration has been
advocated at the corporate level, the Chinese government still consistently
intervenes in major aspects of the economy using macroeconomic policy tools—
for instance, the Central Government utilizing Five-Year Plans to screen major State
enterprise investments and closely monitoring the situation in every industrial
activity.207 The first and foremost policy priority outlined in China’s latest Five-
Year Plan is again ‘reinforcing and enhancing Party leadership and government
macro-control’.208 In the process of deepening China’s market economy and
intensifying market competition, the government will act as the main facilitator of
economic development and adjust the market so that it can direct the route of
transformation.209 The government also plays various roles in business
202 Wacks (2012), p 179.
203 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Human Rights in China—
White Paper (1991), Chapter I; Constitution of Communist Party of China, revised and adopted at the
18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 14 November, 2012. English text of the
Constitution is available at http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html. Although in
form the Party and State systems are separate—each has its own constitution, institutions, and rules—in
practice and ideology the Party and State are combined together by socio-political theories justifying the
supremacy of the Party, such that the Party ‘represents advanced social productive forces (economically),
the progressive course of China’s advanced culture (cultural development), and the fundamental interests
of the Chinese people (political consensus)’. Further details are available at http://english.cpc.people.com.
cn/66739/4521344.html.
204 ‘Shehuizhuyi Chujijieduan Zhuyao Maodun’ (社会主义初级阶段主要矛盾) [The Main Conflicts in
the Initial Stage of Socialism], http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/165617/173273/10357187.html. Also
Orts (2001), p 106.
205 ‘There is disagreement over what the key ingredients of this (China) model might be, but a managed
exchange rate, state control over key industries including the banking system, preference for diktat rather
than democratic debate, heavy state investment in infrastructure and strong support for the export sector
are variously mentioned.’ ‘China Model’, Economist, http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/179;
also Peerenboom (1993), p 53.
206 Breslin (2011), p 1329.
207 Kennedy (2010), p 471.
208 China’s Five-Year Plan, Chapter 1.2 Guiding Thoughts, the Chinese version is available at http://
www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2011-03/16/content_22156007.htm.
209 Chen (2014).
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developments, e.g. as a regulator in overseeing markets, as a supervisor and
promoter of business activities, as well as having a role in the adaptation and
utilization of international rules on corporate governance. Targeted governmental
control on economic growth will be given even greater importance as the macro-
control ideology of this new generation of government, according to Premier Li.210
5.2.3 Impacts of Cultural and Ideological Factors on Capital Provision Reforms
As commented by Orts, law in China ‘presents a mosaic of traditional legal
conceptions, the strong historical influences […] and Marxist theory, and strenuous
current efforts to adapt to the legal requirements of a fast-changing global
economy’.211 The ideological and cultural elements specified above have impacted
on both the substance and processes of China’s sequential attempts at transplanting
Western pro-market legal capital configurations. To begin with, as clearly
elucidated in the Official Notice of Reform, introducing the 2014 legal capital
regime was a ‘major decision made by the Party and the State Council’, reflecting
the gist of ‘the 2nd and 3rd Plenary Sessions of the 18th Central Committee of the
CPC’.212 Furthermore, the substance of this legal capital reform is cautiously placed
within the ideological confines of the so-called ‘socialist market-based economic
reform’213 and by no means challenges the sanctity of the Party-State authoritarian
regime in China. To secure the basic tenet of the current Party-State-led
socialism,214 private economic sectors and free markets, which used to be seen as
signs of capitalism, were first ideologically legitimized in the transplantation
process, by way of the Constitutional stipulation of their necessity in the current
socialist regime.215 The degree of transplanting foreign rules is also cautiously
confined, by stipulating that all sorts of private economic sector should develop to
complement public ownership, which plays ‘a dominant role’ in the current
economic regime in China.216 The supremacy of SOEs also remains after the legal
capital reform, both in their overall economic strength and the occupation of
strategically important sectors, as this is inevitably linked to the Party and the
government’s legitimacy. A cursory look at the 2015 China Top 500 Enterprises list
suggests that SOEs account for 80% of the revenues and nearly 90% of the tax
contributions.217 Of the one hundred Chinese companies on the 2014 Fortune
210 ‘China Stresses ‘Targeted’ Economic Control’, 10 June 2014, http://english.gov.cn/photos/2014/08/
23/content_281474983011916.html.
211 Orts (2001), p 43, at pp 71–72.
212 The State Council, ‘Zhuce Ziben Dengji Zhidu Gaige Fang’an’ (注册资本登记制度改革方案)
[Subscribed Capital Registration Regime Reform Plan], Guofa [2014] No. 7, 7 February 2014.
213 Ibid., Guiding Thoughts.
214 Peerenboom (2010b), p 91.
215 The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (revised on 14 Novmber 2012), General
Programme, para. 9, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/18da/2012-11/19/content_27156212_2.htm.
216 Ibid.
217 ‘China Issues Guideline to Deepen SOE Reforms’, CCTV News, 13 September 2015. http://english.
cntv.cn/2015/09/13/VIDE1442158197379963.shtml.
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Global 500 list, ninety-two are state-owned.218 ‘SOEs should not be weakened, but
should be strengthened’.219 This latest remark from President Jingping Xi not only
epitomizes the overall socio-economic policy tone of the new generation of
government, but also unveils another round of SOE reform, in the hope of
stimulating the vigour of this dominant economic force, put forward in the recent
Communique´ of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the
CPC as discussed in Sect. 3. The fact that the 2014 legal capital reform serves the
purpose of reducing the side-effects of eliminating zombie SOEs best epitomizes the
dominating position of SOEs in the foreseeable future. This is in stark contrast to the
legislative vision and practice in the US ambit, where the capital provision
configurations support a less interventionist administrative regime that constrains
rather than empowers governments.220
The instrumental maxim of the law as a governing tool of the State, and the
Party-State’s dominance echoing the Marxist spirit of law, also manifest in the
process of the latest legal capital reform. According to the Legislation Law of the
PRC, the National People’s Congress (NPC)—the supreme legislative organ
‘through which the people exercise state power’221—enacts and revises ‘basic laws’
such as Company Law, and the State Council is supposedly responsible for the
enactment and revision of ‘administrative laws’ only.222 However, from the initial
reform proposal being put forward up to the final bill receiving NPC approval, the
2014 reform was entirely top-down and dominated by the State Council (the head of
the executive branch of the government), with limited input from non-governmental
actors or the public. The reform plan was first unveiled on 27 October 2013 by the
state media Xinhua News Agency, citing the speech made by Premier Keqiang Li at
the State Council executive meeting on 25 October 2013.223 The grand reform plan
for company law was discussed and announced at the aforementioned meeting of
the State Council, absent any previous scholarly discussions or public consultations.
This premature public disclosure also placed considerable pressures on other
political authorities to pass the reform plan swiftly, almost as a knee-jerk reaction—
the entire reforming plan concerning legal capital put forward by the State Council
was officially approved by the Party-State half a month later in the Central
Committee of the Communist Party’s Third Plenum in November, and then all
detailed company law revisions approved by the NPC in December 2013, without
revision, less than two months later. Legal scholars and the public were not given
adequate time or opportunities to offer input to the making of these new legal capital
rules, either in the process of drafting or at the reviewing and passage stages. Local
218 Ibid.
219 Tan Yan, ‘Jingping Xi: SOEs Should not Be Weakened, but Should Be Further Strengthened’, Jiefang
Daily, 6 March 2014.
220 Ginsburg (2000), p 836.
221 For more information concerning the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China,
see http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Organization/node_2846.htm.
222 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法) [Legislation Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (promulgated by the President of the People’s Republic of China, 15 March 2000,
effective 1 July 2000), Art. 7.
223 http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20131027/160117127254.shtml; see also Jiang (2014).
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testing of the proposed reform was also carried out in a hasty manner—
experimentation was only initiated in two pilot cities, Shenzhen and Zhuhai, in
March 2013, offering a limited test run of less than six months’ duration before this
important reform of law came to fruition224; followed by another experiment
launched in Shanghai in September,225 just one month prior to the launch of the
reform plan. The short duration of these pilot schemes rendered it impossible for
scholars and the public to fully examine the feasibility of the planned reform, and to
make bottom-up innovation contributions as envisaged.226 It is thus no wonder that
in scholarly words, this legislative amendment was described as ‘forced’ by the
State Council,227 with them being given no option other than ‘passive acceptance’
of the entire reform plan.228
Although one major purpose of the 2014 reform, as discussed in Sect. 3, is to
reduce administrative control and to give full play to the basic role of the market in
resource allocation and efficiency creation, the process and substance of the
legislative reform continue to evidence the strong force of administrative orders.
While the transplanted rules follow the US RMBCA in form, the ignorance or
downplaying of the tremendous institutional variations has made the reform largely
a gesture by which the Chinese government has tried to reduce governmental
control and inject liberal market values. The case of legal capital reform is thus a
prime example attesting to the impact of socio-cultural factors in shaping China’s
legislative reforms, and to Montesquieu’s statement that imported law owes its very
existence to its fit to local conditions.
6 Further Irritants Impeding the Effect of the 2014 Transplantation
As described in the previous section, conventional cultural norms and practices
continue to permeate many areas of Chinese society, which will invariably affect the
actual workings of capital provision treatments borrowed from the US and possibly
trigger a series of new and unforeseen events as spillovers. These so-called legal
irritants are likely to emerge from two aspects. The first is connected with the
pragmatic legislative culture and sporadic borrowing activities in China, which is
doctrinally observed in the field of capital maintenance. The second type of irritant
224 Certain Provisions of Commercial Registration of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, Regulations of
Commercial Registration of Zhuhai Special Economic Zone; and State Administration for Industry and
Commerce’s Approval on the Reform Plan of Commercial Registration of Business License of
Guangdong Province.
225 Several Opinions on Supporting the Building-up of China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone issued by
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, and Regulations of Registration Administration of
Enterprises in China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone issued by Shanghai Administration for Industry
and Commerce.
226 Peerenboom (2006), p 850.
227 See comments in Zou and Chen (2014), p 19, ‘When scholars are still debating how Company Law
should react to the State Council’s plan to change the corporate registration system, legislators have
already finished amending and approved Company Law […]’.
228 Lei and Xue (2015), p 36.
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occurs because of the powerful socio-economic idiosyncrasies of the host, where
transplanted ‘law in books’ is moulded to a different reality. This type of irritant is
most likely to emerge in corporate financing practices following the latest
legislative amendment, given that legal capital is an essential component of the
financial structure of a company.
6.1 Legislators’ Distaste for Capital Maintenance
In stark contrast to Chinese lawmakers’ enthusiasm for relaxing the mandatory
confines of capital provision, the connected area of capital maintenance has become
a desolate field of reform—it was barely touched in the 2005 company law reform,
and was completely ignored in the 2014 amendment. This was hardly because of the
flawless state of the existing capital maintenance regime; on the contrary, several
doctrinal loopholes were clearly noticeable in this field, a typical example being the
potential opportunism generated by financial assistance provided to third parties
who acquire company shares, as discussed in Sect. 4.229 Far more illustrative of the
inadequacy of capital maintenance is the pronounced absence of any legal provision
governing so-called ‘hidden distributions’, which are strictly prohibited in many
jurisdictions.230 For instance, in the US, although the RMBCA does not explicitly
prohibit this type of transfer, characterized by inadequacy and an unusual course of
trade, it falls neatly into the category of ‘constructive fraud’ and is therefore
governed by fraudulent transfer laws.231
Chinese legislators’ inattention to capital maintenance may also be explained
from the instrumental perspective. In comparison with capital provision rules, rules
relevant to capital maintenance are of lower utility in realizing immediate socio-
economic imperatives, i.e. legitimizing and encouraging growth in private sectors,
since these rules would only become relevant and applicable after private businesses
are set up. However, such legislative inattention has unsurprisingly resulted in the
continuity of doctrinal loopholes in the field of capital maintenance; coupled with
the fact that essential ex post court-based remedies that execute similar creditor
protection functions to ex ante mandates thus far have no real counterpart in China,
as explained in Sect. 4. The balance between creditors and shareholders has thus
been further tilted in favour of the latter, as an adverse aspect of the latest capital
provision reform.
229 See above n. 130.
230 ‘A hidden distribution requires an exchange of economic goods between the corporation and a
shareholder (or a person close to the shareholder) at terms that the corporation would not have agreed to
when dealing with an unrelated third party.’ Mu¨lbert and Birke (2002), pp 703 and 706.
231 ‘Badges of fraud’ were initially set forth in Twyne’s case as grounds for fraudulent transfer litigations.
Twyne’s Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). The focal points of fraudulent transfer
are now much more broadly defined in the US regulatory system, preventing the debtor from making
transfers or incurring obligations for less than reasonably equivalent value. E.g. Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act §§ 4 (a), 5 (a) and (b); 11 USC, § 548 (a)(1)(A)-(B). This cause of action, named
‘constructive fraud’, enables courts to void certain transfers that were not made with fraudulent intent, but
worked to the detriment of the creditors. Zaretsky (1995), pp 1171–1172.
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6.2 Capital-Starved Start-Ups
Even ifwe assume the efficiency of the recent legislative change of capital provision in
stimulating business registration, there still remains the issue of corporate capital-
ization, as the boom in private entrepreneur activities triggered by the abolition of
minimum capital calls for a greater supply of credit. It is true that Chinese legislators
do not explicitly restrain the freedom of private enterprises to obtain capital, but
inevitably in practice the question arises of how far a founding member with limited
initial capital contribution can be said to enjoy the benefit brought about by the recent
legislative change, if he is denied adequate access to loan capital. For most general
creditors, the limited business size and the short credit history of start-ups simply do
not merit capital provision. Even if some might be willing to offer these companies a
chance, higher rates of interest would be amust.232 ‘The Poor PaysMore’ is indeed the
case for start-ups, even in the US where capital provision treatment is most liberal. A
probable risk follows from this legislative change in China, in that there would likely
be a shortage of affordable sources of capital for new start-ups, with correspondingly
greater risks of undercapitalization.
Going one step further, the profound functional differences between SOEs and
private businesses in China are not going to be altered by this legislative change,
much less their differential treatments in capitalization. At the moment, four major
financing sources are available (at least on paper) for all Chinese firms: domestic
bank loans, firms’ self-fundraising, the State budget, and foreign direct invest-
ment.233 However, in practice private enterprises receive little support from State
banks, which are pressurized to prioritize credit for SOEs with a view to securing
the legitimacy of the socialist regime.234 Research has shown that State banks have
channelled the bulk of their loans to State firms and local government vehicles, and
they will, at least in the near future, continue to strategically prioritize key industries
and State-owned economic entities.235
When State banking is tight with lending credit, whether private start-ups
incentivized by the changes in capital provision will be sufficiently funded counts
on the capacity of private creditors.236 To their disenchantment, private banking in
China is still significantly underdeveloped, as evidenced by the large percentage of
government ownership in the banking sector. Up to August 2013 State-owned banks
accounted for 75.2% of the total market share, and only one private bank—the
Minsheng Banking Corp.—was among the country’s ten largest commercial
lenders.237 Although a plan has been unveiled to set up more private banks,238
232 Ramsay (2001), p 572.
233 Allen et al. (2009), p 79.
234 Welborn (2002), p 400.
235 Kevin Yao, ‘China to Set Up More Private Banks to Help Small Firms’, Reuters, 12 August 2013.
Breslin (2011), p 1331.
236 Armour (2000), p 18.
237 Yao, above n. 235.
238 Victoria Bi and Kevin Yao, ‘China Approves Pilot Plan to Set Up Private Banks’, Reuters, 6 January
2014.
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whether financial support for cash-starved start-ups will be boosted is yet to be seen,
given that the scheme is only at a pilot stage, and the China Banking Regulatory
Commission and other State banking authorities have already vowed to implement
‘prudential regulatory standards’239 in approving and closely supervising the
performance of these pilot private banks.
6.3 Further Reliance on Informal Social Networks
Where formal banking support is not conveniently accessible to new start-ups,
economic actors have been quick to develop informal reputation- and relationship-
based alternatives to achieve their financing ends.240 The huge capitalization gap in
China’s private sectors has thus far been filled largely by an unofficial system that is
vibrant, but furtive, and in most circumstances illegal, known as shadow banking.241
Along with the growth of the private sector, the financial composition in China has
shifted from conventional bank domination in the 1970s, when the economy was
starting to open up and banks provided more than 90% of all funding in the
economy, to the recent and significant involvement of non-bank institutions, with
banks now accounting for only half of all the new funding in the economy.242
Meanwhile, the complexity of the Chinese shadow banking system also indicates
that increasing legal order has not completely substituted the overarching cultural
feature of guanxi in China’s development. Differing from the US style of shadow
banking, which primarily involves ‘prestigious Wall Street firms and complex
financial instruments’,243 household- and firm-level ventures supply the majority of
the shadow banking credit in China.244 The composition of this lending network is
enormously intricate, consisting of both quasi-financial institutions, including
micro-loan companies and pawn shops, and distinct forms of informal financial
institutions such as private money houses, folk cooperative finance—the list goes
on.245
While it lacks the coercive apparatus of formal banking, such unofficial financing
sources secured by close-knit social networks possess advantages of quick
accessibility and simplicity—without the formal evaluation process, it is usually
faster and easier to obtain credit by these routes than via banking capitalization.246
Business relations are also relatively stable, given that in a collectivized society
239 Ibid.
240 Ginsburg (2000), p 834.
241 Shadow banking is defined by the Financial Stability Board as ‘the system of credit intermediation
that involves entities and activities […] occurring fully or partly outside the regular banking system’.
Financial Stability Board, ‘Shadow Banking: Scoping the Issues’, 12 April 2011, http://www.
financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_110412a.pdf; also Li (2014).
242 Simon Rabinovitch, ‘China Draws up New Rules to Curb Shadow Banking Risks’, Financial Times, 6
January 2014.
243 Paul Krugman, ‘Will China Break’, NY Times, 18 December 2011.
244 Welborn (2002), p 398.
245 Jianjun Li and Sara Hus, ‘Shadow Banking in China’ (Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No.
39441, 5 June 2012), pp 1 and 26.
246 Peerenboom (1993), p 55.
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social ties can be more resilient than formal business connections in times of
uncertainty. As of 2011, all-system financing amounted to RMB 12.83 trillion, with
shadow banking accounting for 41.7%.247 The Chinese characteristics of shadow
banking and relationship business will thus continue to mitigate the shortage of
capital provision for private entrepreneurship, which in turn will further consolidate
relationship investment and promote economic development.
While the recent legislative change in capital provision may prompt a further
surge in shadow banking activities to fill the capitalization gap left by conventional
banking, all the adverse consequences of shadow banking are also likely to amplify.
Undeniably, the underground nature of many shadow finance channels renders them
beyond the sight of banking regulation, and tremendous variations in the finance
offered further add to the difficulty of governance. As such, it is difficult for
regulators to either assess the default risks or curb adverse social impacts—for
instance, excessive speculation and asset bubbles. As revealed in practice, many
shadow financiers have flagrantly attempted to get around formal banking rules,
particularly the ones concerning interest rates and illegal fund-raising.248 To take
the example of Wenzhou, a city famous for its small and medium enterprise
development, unofficial lending has been a common business practice since the
opening up of China’s economy, with 89% of households and 57% of firms
estimated to have borrowed money from shadow channels at some point.249 The
interest rates charged by private lenders are commonly higher than official bank
rates, rising to 60% annually and in certain cases even up to 180%.250 This massive
informal lending network managed to take the place of banks in Wenzhou for a
good length of time, but collapsed in 2011 when labour costs and raw material
expenses rose, which caused bankruptcies of SME loaners and subsequent
malpractice among private lenders. From 2011 to 2012, in this particular city at
least ten indebted people committed suicide and two hundred people fled to other
regions to escape debt.251 Because of its enormous size and growing activity in
China, in the eyes of many, shadow banking already stands out as an imminent
threat to financial stability.252 However, it is difficult for legislators to designate and
implement prudent macro-control tools governing shadow banking operations,
given that (1) little data/information is available about the precise scale, nature, and
variation of the sector; and (2) it would be hard to fill the capitalization gap should
247 Li and Hus, above n. 245, at p 1.
248 Ibid., at p 25, ‘The phenomenon of illegally raising funds is common in China and it appears in 29
provinces or cities. From early 2005 to June 2010 there were more than 10,000 cases of illegal fund-
raising in China’.
249 Linda Yueh, ‘The Shadowy Threat from China’s Lenders’, BBC News, 6 March 2014.
250 ‘Wenzhou Usury Alarms National Financial Climate’, 30 September 2011, http://www.ecns.cn/in-
depth/2011/09-30/2775.shtml.
251 ‘Qunian Wenzhou yin Minjian Jiedai 10 Ren Zisha 200Ren Paolu’ (去年温州因民间借贷10人自杀
200人跑路) [Last Year in Wenzhou 10 Committed Suicide and 200 Fled due to Unofficial Lending], Sina
News, 13 March 2012. http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/dfjj/20120313/084211574332.shtml.
252 Shadow banks ‘now have assets of at least thirty trillion RMB ($4.9 trillion), or more than 50% of
GDP’. ‘China’s Shadow Banks: A Moving Target’, Economist, 6 September 2014. Angela Monaghan,
‘Shadow Banking System a Growing Risk to Financial Stability—IMF’, The Guardian, 1 October 2014.
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informal lending be completely banned. Risks will thus continue to lurk within the
arena of shadow banking in China, spurred by the recent legislative change in
capital provision.
7 Economic Effects of the 2014 Reform and Further Reform Suggestions
7.1 Impacts on Boosting Private Economy Sectors
One of the primary questions that legal transplant proponents must be invited to
answer is the practical effect of a displacement. As identified in the above section,
one of the primary aims of the 2014 legislative move as identified by the State
Council—reducing governmental interference in marketization—has largely
become rhetoric, hindered not just by the doctrinal incompatibilities to the existing
rules of the game, but also by deeply-embedded ideological and cultural factors.
Judging from statistics, another acclaimed goal of the 2014 reform—boosting
private economic sector—has become largely a gesture rather than reality, too.
While official comments praised the effect of the legislative change by citing a
booming increase of the number of start-ups—a total of 4.854 million new
companies registered in 2015253 and another 2.6 million new companies starting in
2016254—the direct causation link between the number of start-ups and the
legislative changes is assumed rather than conclusively proved. These official media
also ignore or deliberately downplay the potential risks associated with the booming
numbers, including the high failure rate of start-ups and bad loans. The real effect of
the 2014 reform in terms of stimulating the private economy is perhaps better
appreciated from the size and overall performance of the private sector since its
implementation, which have been continually declining. As shown, the average
6.7% GDP growth in 2015 and the first two quarters of 2016 has been powered
almost entirely by the state economy.255 In the first half of 2016 private investment
in China grew by just 2.8%, following nearly 30% annual average growth over the
past decade.256 In June 2016 it even started to wither, falling for the first time since
China started tracking the data in 2004, and it seems that this trend will continue.257
Credit demands and sources available to private economic actors also shrank
significantly over the past two years—statistics have shown that private sector debt
has fallen from 48% of total assets in 2008 to 35% in 2015, while the State sector
rose to 53% over the same period.258 Real life figures indicate this legislative move
253 Zhang Lulu, ‘China’s Startup Boom: 7 New Firms Every Minute’, 9 June 2015, http://www.china.
org.cn/business/2015-06/09/content_35775291.htm.
254 ‘Premier Li Urges Further Reform of Business Registration’, State Council News, 17 October 2016,
http://english.gov.cn/premier/news/2016/10/17/content_281475468530616.htm.
255 ‘China’s Economy: Strong, but for How Long?’, The Economist, 15 July 2016.
256 Mark Magnier, ‘The Private Pain of China’s Economy’, The Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2016.
257 Mark Magnier, ‘The Private Pain of China’s Economy’, The Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2016.
258 Yuan Yang and Tom Mitchell, ‘China’s Private Sector Misses Out on Credit Boom’, Financial Times,
3 July 2016.
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has been functioning more as a hospitable gesture to private economy, rather than an
effective method to rebalance the economy away from state-dominated heavy
industry as desired.
7.2 Reform Suggestions
As discussed in previous sections, the contextual specifics of China and the top-
down, selective adoption of foreign norms have made the actual workings of legal
capital transplants less than desirable. While the deeply embedded historical and
political influences that honour the sanctity of the Party-State-led economy are
unlikely to change, one can see the force and urgency of filling the doctrinal
loopholes that cause problems in practice. As a first step, further ex post creditor
protection means are called for to correct the imbalance between shareholders and
creditors. These would include a statutory inclusion of the equitable subordination
doctrine and fraudulent transfer laws, which would help alleviate the difficulties of
unsecured creditor protection and address the issue of improper/excessive veil-
piercing applications to private companies. Further clarity is also sought with regard
to the scope of veil-piercing to improve the functionality of this ex post creditor
protection means, so that the problem of selective adoption could be eliminated to
the greatest possible extent.
Effective creditor protection rests heavily on companies providing adequate and
accurate information. Particularly in cases concerning dwarf companies, effective ex
ante disclosure of corporate capital information would raise outsiders’ awareness
when dealing with the company. Accompanying the current Enterprise Credit
Management System, mechanisms for appraising and punishing poor-quality,
incomplete, or false information disclosure should be properly designed in law, and
the responsibilities of different governmental organs should be clarified. This not
only would improve the quality of information disclosure, but would help alleviate
the over-application of veil-piercing in judicial practice—at the moment, if
shareholders and company legal representatives fail to report essential corporate
information, creditors of the company do not have recourse apart from suing under
Article 20 of the Company Law, which, as discussed in Sect. 4, has already been
showing signs of excessive use and risks destabilizing the foundation of modern
company law—the sanctity of the separate legal personality doctrine.259 Addition-
ally, given the fact that companies can now opt out of disclosing most of their
essential financial information, the scope of information that enterprises are required
to disclose should be expanded. These developments will heighten current and
potential creditors’ awareness of the concerned company’s financial situation, and
work to circumvent the fraudulent activities spurred by information asymmetries.
With regard to the legislative process, adopting a collaboratively dialogic
approach that facilitates discussion between different state and non-state actors
would help fill the doctrinal loopholes, and promote acceptance of the legislative
development between various social forces. Most importantly, it would contribute to
achieving the ongoing institutional reform plan of the State Council—transforming
259 Supra notes 141–147, also Hawes et al. (2015), p 19.
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the function of the government and reducing arbitrary government intervention in
law-making and marketization. Although the above suggested measures would not
elevate the private economic sector to the same primary standing as the state
economy, which is endemic to China’s socio-political setting, at least they would
help in terms of eliminating doctrinal loopholes, providing more effective redress
means to unsecured creditors, allowing greater transparency in business informa-
tion, and ensuring more public supervision of corporate operations and legislative
progress.
8 Concluding Remarks
The focus of long-standing theoretical and doctrinal debates, the mobility of laws
continues to generate public concern today, four hundred years after Montesquieu
cast justifiable doubt on the feasibility of this process.260 In light of a recent
statutory modification of Chinese Company Law, which was regarded by many as
imitating the capital provision arrangements in the US RMBCA, this paper
considers the fit of these foreign norms to the Chinese context, in the hope of
shedding light on the contentious theme of the applicability of legal transplants.
After a brief exposition of two major legal capital frameworks and the trajectory
of legal capital reforms in China in Sects. 2, 3 discussed the national-specific
objectives that each legal capital amendment was seeking to serve, exhibiting the
instrumental feature of law in China. This was followed by a detailed evaluation of
the current legal capital framework from the doctrinal lens in Sect. 4. From the
doctrinal perspective, the latest legislative reform focusing on eliminating capital
provision barriers is not as urgent as correcting existing structural shortfalls in the
field of capital maintenance, and even creates a few more doctrinal loopholes.
However, if one considers this legislative move in the context of the general socio-
economic climate of China, the borrowed provisions intending to espouse private
entrepreneurship are comprehensible—as acknowledged by the Chinese govern-
ment, the need to foster the private economy is real and urgent—and serve as an
essential and integrated component of a State-led reform towards State-planned
economic and social ends. They particularly aim to relieve the current ‘cash crunch’
pressures faced by Chinese banks, ameliorate excessive production capacities, and
facilitate a successful economic transition from the conventional export-dominated
model to one based more heavily on domestic growth. Additional to its direct
stimulating effect on private entrepreneurship, the Chinese government also hopes
this move will show its determination to reduce administrative interference, thus
boosting investors’ confidence and helping to sustain China’s economic growth.
While the 2014 legislative reform of legal capital constitutes part and parcel of
State-led attempts to pursue immediate socio-economic agendas, in particular the
promotion of the private economy and the reduction of government interference in
marketization, the initial high hopes have not been fully realised by this law-making
experience. Other than the doctrinal incompatibilities between the borrowed
260 Montesquieu, above n. 19, at p 14.
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provisions and existing legal frameworks, as discussed in Sect. 4, conventional
Chinese cultural norms and practices, given their continuing influence in society,
also impact on the actual workings of these borrowed configurations, impeding their
anticipated effect of encouraging private entrepreneurship. Sections 5 and 6 address
this matter by respectively discussing the weight of national-specific contextual
embeddings and resultant spillover effects of these transplanted rules. As discussed
in Sect. 5, instrumentality and State centrality are rooted in China’s unique socio-
political settings, and have underpinned the whole substance and process of
legislative reform. This is in stark contrast to the ideological underpinnings of the
enabling US company law regime, where the legal configuration honours the
sanctity of market actor autonomy over State control, and upholds a less
interventionist administrative regime that constrains rather than empowers
governments.261
Under a different orientation of law, one directed towards the State rather than at
private regulation, the borrowed US deregulatory formulation of legal capital will
inevitably be domesticated, generating practical consequences unique to the Chinese
context—i.e. the so-called irritants arising from legal transplantation discussed in
Sect. 6. This section maps out two major areas where irritants will likely emerge:
foreseeable capital-shortages for start-ups, and heavier reliance upon the shadow
banking sector. These potential spillovers, particularly the latter, again spring from the
particular socio-cultural norms of China, specifically the State-centred policy imper-
ative and the continuing influenceofConfucianismemphasizing tight-knit interpersonal
relationships in Chinese society. It shows that even in the sphere of commercial law,
where rules are regarded as easily transferable, deeply engrained legal ideologies may
set boundaries to the function of transplantation. As exhibited in real-life figures in
Sect. 7, over the past two years, since the legislative reform, the private economic sector
saw an overall decline, rather than the boom thatwas hoped for, and this trend is likely to
continue in the foreseeable future. This article thus holds to Montesquieu’s line of
reasoning about the law linking with the socio-political organization of a society from
the perspective of company and commercial laws, where the mobility of law view
conventionally prevails. While it would be premature to rule out the will of Chinese
governments to stimulate the growth of the private economy, to realize the economic
structural transformation agenda and to make China’s development better integrated
with the rest of the world, as well as the positive impact of the 2014 legal capital reform
in filling certain doctrinal loopholes, doctrinal and practical challenges still remain for
the current legal capital framework to exert its full force as hoped.
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